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For over a century, federal courts have, with several exceptions, re-
fused to admit evidence seized in a manner inconsistent with the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures.  An incomplete history of the exclusionary rule is familiar to
any lawyer or law student who has taken constitutional criminal pro-
cedure.1  This often leaves an impression that the rule is an overbroad
federal doctrine the Court stumbled into late in the nineteenth cen-
tury to prevent the investigation of business crimes in Boyd v. United
States.2  The rule was refined to its modern form in the early twentieth
century in Weeks v. United States.3  Then, Mapp v. Ohio imposed it on
the states as the only way to deter police misconduct in 1961.4  This
traditionally-offered account fails to consider state court opinions and
does not look at patterns of criminal enforcement to understand why
courts began to reject reliable evidence of crimes in order to give
courts a mechanism to regulate police.5
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship, Duquesne University.  I am
grateful for comments from participants at the Vanderbilt Criminal Justice Roundtable, includ-
ing Tom Clancy, Andrew Crespo, Fiona Doherty, Mary Fan, Aya Gruber, Nancy King, Richard
McAdams, Richard Myers, Eric Miller, and Chris Slobogin.
1. This Supreme Court-centric approach appears in a number of places.  Almost all criminal
procedure casebooks begin their exclusionary rule sections with Mapp, with some books begin-
ning with Boyd. See Robert Weisberg, A New Legal Realism for Criminal Procedure, 49 BUFF.
L. REV. 909, 911 (2001) (observing Warren Court focus of criminal procedure casebooks).  Not
surprisingly, Potter Stewart’s history of the rule in the Columbia Law Review looks only at the
Court upon which he sat.  The passage of time has not changed our approach.  Potter Stewart,
The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond:  The Origins, Development, and Future of the Exclusion-
ary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1983).  Tracey Maclin’s recent
book-length treatment of the exclusionary rule similarly limits itself to its development in the
United States Supreme Court—as its title indicates, it set out to trace only this history. TRACEY
MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE (2012).
2. 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court
Taketh Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 933, 955 (2010).
3. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 341 (1914).
4. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. Critics of the rule in the New York Constitutional Convention of 1938 contended that the
rule was a New Deal-style rule that substituted the judgment of the elite for the will of the
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Stripped of the historical context that led to the exclusionary rule’s
acceptance, modern lawyers tend to either absolutely accept or reject
the legitimacy of the rule.  For most, it is either a rule that was always
appropriate, a right answer that courts discovered about a century into
the republic, or one that was wrongly adopted and never had an ap-
propriate place in American law.  Civil libertarians and defense-ori-
ented lawyers generally regard the rule as an indispensable tool in
curbing illegal searches and seizures.6  On the other hand, law-and-
order types have largely regarded the rule as an act of judicial fiat that
finds no support in the Framing Era and punishes society for the mis-
deeds of officers.7  The forgotten historical context reveals a basis for
a very different discussion—one that asks whether the rule is an ap-
propriate and necessary limit on police for some moments in history,
but not others.
The exclusionary rule gained its greatest traction during Prohibition
when society became obsessed with finding a way to force police to
obey constitutional limits.  Search and seizure violations reached a
high-water mark in American history during this period.  Searches for
liquor were quite invasive—saloons were smashed up,8 car upholstery
slashed,9 and homes ransacked.10  Officers in unmarked cars fired on
innocent motorists who had no way of knowing if they were being
stopped or robbed.11  The Detroit River was a war zone where Prohi-
bition agents resorted to any degree of force necessary to seize ships
suspected of rum running.12  In the minds of even staunch present-day
opponents of the rule, the tradeoff of sacrificing reliable evidence to
people.  Instead of a bureaucratic agency, judges were identified as “experts,” who imposed their
vision of good on society, so the criticism ran.  1 REVISED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 578–603 (1938). See also WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE
LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN NEW YORK, 1920–1980, at 125–27
(2001).
6. But see Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REV. 363.
7. See Binyamin Blum, Doctrines without Borders: The “New” Israeli Exclusionary Rule and
the Dangers of Legal Transplantation, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2131, 2137 (2008) (“[T]he United States,
England, and Australia all developed an exclusionary rule through judicial fiat.”); Roger Roots,
The Framers’ Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Mounting Evidence, 15 NEV. L. J. 42,
46 (2014) (noting that when he began his research, “every constitutional scholar who expressed
any opinion on the origins of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule repeated the claim that
the rule is in defiance of the Framers’ original intent”).
8. J. ANNE FUNDERBERG, BOOTLEGGER AND BEER BARONS OF THE PROHIBITION ERA 347
(2014).
9. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
10. LISA MCGIRR, THE WAR ON ALCOHOL: PROHIBITION AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN
STATE (2015).
11. LARRY ENGELMANN, INTEMPERANCE: THE LAW AGAINST LIQUOR 38 (1979).
12. Id. at 69.
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curb rampant unjustified physical intrusions during Prohibition would
likely be defensible.
The historical context of the exclusionary rule’s rise reveals that the
Supreme Court may have misdirected its efforts when it chose to im-
pose this rule—capable of deterring only the illegal acquisition of evi-
dence—on state courts. Mapp v. Ohio was decided in 1961.  The
1960s were a time of tremendous unrest between citizens and police.
Police brutality, not an officer’s power to search, was feared.  The Su-
preme Court has frequently described its regulation of police as at-
tempting to achieve a balance between law enforcement needs and
individual liberty.13  Requiring the states to adopt a rule that deterred
officers from engaging in illegal searches and seizures often sacrificed
the convictions of guilty individuals and imposed substantial costs on
society’s interest in combatting crime.  The Court’s incursion into the
prerogatives of police in the 1960s seemingly should have addressed
inappropriate use of official violence.  Many of the staunchest sup-
porters—and most vigorous opponents—of the exclusionary rule
would likely agree that police brutality raises far more serious con-
cerns than illegal searches, both then and now.
There is a tendency to think of judicial decisions—particularly
landmark judicial opinions with which we agree—as statements of
universal principles, unmoored from the contemporary circumstances
in which they were decided.14  Precedent takes on a timeless feel.  As
late as 1960, Supreme Court citations contained no indication of the
date of decisions they cited.15  While critics of an opinion may claim
13. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 722 (1983) (“[A] reviewing court must bal-
ance the individual’s interest in privacy against the Government’s law enforcement interest and
determine whether the seizure was reasonable under the circumstances.”); Arizona v. Gant, 556
U.S. 332, 345–46 (2009) (rejecting the State’s argument that a bright-line rule for searches inci-
dent to arrest of automobile in New York v. Belton properly strikes balance between law en-
forcement interests and arrestee’s interest in privacy in automobile); Moran v Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 424 (1986) (rejecting invitation to extend Miranda, concluding that the decision “strikes the
proper balance between society’s legitimate law enforcement interests and the defendant’s Fifth
Amendment rights”).  Commentators have similarly argued that the overall program of Fourth
Amendment regulation ought to strike such a balance. See, e.g., David Gray & Danielle Citron,
The Right to Quantitative Policy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 111 (2013) (“As in all Fourth Amendment
cases, the guiding principle would be to strike a reasonable balance between the needs of law
enforcement and the privacy interests of suspects and society at large.”).
14. Stewart Macauly, Popular Legal Culture: An Introduction, 98 YALE L. J. 1545, 1551 (1989)
(describing Supreme Court claims that its decisions involve “timeless judicial neutrality”).
15. It seems that in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the convention began to change. See, e.g.,
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (Fourth Amendment case containing an appendix
identifying which states had the exclusionary rule prior to Weeks v. United States, after Weeks,
and after Wolf v. Colorado.  Despite the historical nature of the appendix, none of the citations
in the opinion included years); see also Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584 (1959) (interro-
gation case that provided no year for the one U.S. Supreme Court case it cited); Spano v. New
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that a decision is wrong and ought to be overruled, one rarely hears
that a judicial decision was appropriate for a particular time, but inap-
propriate for another.  Courts themselves consider the continuing via-
bility of precedent by looking at whether: the precedent is practically
workable, society has come to rely on the rule, other rules have
eroded the decision, and facts have changed since the rule was
announced.16
My critique of Mapp, however, is not that changes since 1961 sug-
gest it should be overruled, but rather that Mapp was the wrong deci-
sion for 1961.  Prohibition was a time like no other, creating profound
fears of corruption as well as concern about honest but zealous en-
forcement.  The balance between a court’s search for truth and the
need to control officers could quite understandably be different when
the crime is bootlegging and lawless searches are causing outrage
throughout the nation.  It is plausible that Prohibition awakened state
courts to a rule that was essential to ordered liberty that the Court
eventually embraced in Mapp.  The social context of the Mapp deci-
sion suggests, however, that a concern other than search and seizure
should have animated the Court’s decision.  Indeed, the opinion itself
suggests that the Court was concerned with matters other than the
search for incriminating evidence.
This Article contends that the Supreme Court, with Mapp v. Ohio,
mimicked the regulation of police in the states for the previous hun-
dred years, creating a system that carefully managed searches for li-
quor, but left the use of police force beyond judicial control.
Remarkably Mapp did so at a time when there was no epidemic of
illegal searches, but rather substantial concerns about police brutality
that were about to create a firestorm.  The need for a mechanism for
judicial oversight of police was clear, but the need to prevent illegal
searches was far from compelling.  Borrowing a century-old scheme,
the Supreme Court in Mapp addressed the fears of the 1960s with a
remedy for the abuses of the 1920s. Mapp’s critics contend that the
decision was inappropriate because the exclusion of reliable evidence
is never justified.17  A weaker version of this argument seems com-
York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959) (including the year for citations to Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936) and Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), but did not provide citations to less
seminal U.S. Supreme Court opinions, such as Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945)).
Mapp v. Ohio, 368 U.S. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) is a groundbreaking case in constitutional criminal
procedure in many ways.  It appears to be the first such case in which every citation to a case
includes a reference to the year in which it was decided.
16. See Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992).
17. Kenneth W. Starr & Audrey L. Maness, Reasonable Remedies and the Exclusionary Rule,
43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 373, 374–75 (2010).
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pelled by the historical context. Mapp adopted a rule that was not
capable of addressing the most troubling contemporary police miscon-
duct—or indeed the most troubling police misconduct of our time—
excessive force.
The first Part of this Article describes the rise of modern police and
vice crimes.  As police emerged in mid-nineteenth century American
society, there were new threats to liberty, but searches were not the
most pressing concern.  There were frequent complaints about the
brutality of these officers.  Defenders of these early officers were able
to convince society to accept police brutality as a necessary evil—or
even a positive good.  Civil service reforms successfully assured the
public that police would only use unnecessary force against the crimi-
nal element.18  Police were thus permitted to self-regulate their use of
force into the twentieth century.
Oddly, search and seizure concerns alone prompted reforms in the
mid-nineteenth century to curb the power of police.  Mid-nineteenth
century society saw not only a new type of policing but a new type of
criminal statute.  Vice crimes and their enforcement became a new
part of American life.  States throughout the Northeast and Midwest
adopted short-lived statewide prohibitory laws about seventy years
before National Prohibition.19  While versions of the exclusionary rule
had made early but rare appearances near the dawn of the republic,20
a number of states began to adopt mechanisms to deny the state the
fruits of unlawful liquor searches.  All citizens, wealthy or poor, black
or white, were caught in the snare of early liquor laws.  Courts em-
braced a very early version of what we now call the exclusionary rule
to ensure that those investigating suspected violations of the new con-
troversial laws had an adequate basis for their searches.
Efforts to enforce National Prohibition would be considerably more
aggressive as the law enforcement apparatus had developed at the
federal and state level and the private groups interested in assisting
with the effort included the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s.  The second
Part of this Article describes the considerably more robust response to
fears of police searches, as complaints about twentieth-century alcohol
searches dominated headlines.  Most liquor searches in the 1850s were
initiated by the equivalent of an application for a search warrant, spe-
18. See MARILYNN JOHNSON, STREET JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF POLICE VIOLENCE IN NEW
YORK CITY (2003).
19. RONALD F. FORMISANO, FOR THE PEOPLE: AMERICAN POPULIST MOVEMENTS FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE 1850S, at 290 n.18 (2008).
20. See Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the Fourth Amendment, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 1
(2009–2010).
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cifically a complaint alleging possession of alcohol.  Search warrants in
liquor cases were unique in requiring applicants to state the basis of
their suspicions, making the failure to allege the basis for probable
cause a concern in liquor cases alone.  Warrantless searches were far
more common in the 1920s.  Accordingly, state courts frustrated with
unlawful searches for liquor began to adopt a version of the exclusion-
ary rule not limited to liquor searches.  Thus, a more generic form of
the exclusionary rule emerged in National Prohibition to address the
problem of rampant abuses of the Fourth Amendment in the search
for alcohol.  This Part analyzes state court regulation of search and
seizure during National Prohibition, demonstrating that alcohol regu-
lation forced the hand of state courts.
The exclusionary rule was the only mechanism for judicial oversight
of police practices that enjoyed any degree of judicial support when
Mapp v. Ohio was decided, but it did nothing to address the most
pressing concerns about police in the early 1960s.  The final Part of
this Article therefore suggests that the Supreme Court embraced the
wrong rule to address the needs of its time—or indeed, our time.
Mapp’s primary premises fall apart when the historical context of the
case is considered. To impose the exclusionary rule on all states,
Mapp relied on the need to deter illegal searches and seizures and the
fact that a large number of state courts already utilized the rule.21
State courts, however, had adopted the rule because of a unique pe-
riod of rampant illegal searches that had long passed by 1961.  The
historical record further does not support the Court’s implicit claim
that tort law had proven inadequate to limit illegal searches.  Outside
of Los Angeles, search and seizure concerns do not appear to have
garnered attention in the 1950s or early 1960s.  Police brutality was
(and is), by contrast, a pressing issue and one that seemed to concern
the Court in Mapp.  Since Mapp, courts have continuously addressed
the scope of an officer’s power to search, but have not defined the
limits on an officer’s appropriate use of force.  The price paid for this
ambiguity has been high—Watts in 1965 and Ferguson in 2015.
Critics of Mapp and the exclusionary rule have long contended that
ignoring reliable evidence is contrary to a court’s function.22  The his-
torical context reveals a far more scathing critique of Mapp that will
resonate with civil libertarians. Mapp spent the Court’s political capi-
tal to deter one of the least troubling aspects of police misconduct in
21. 367 U.S. at 651–52.
22. See, e.g., JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 2184 (1905).
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the 1960s, while leaving the use of force largely beyond judicial
oversight.
II. EMERGENCE OF POLICE AND VICE CRIMES
Two innovations in the mid-nineteenth century fundamentally re-
shaped criminal law and its enforcement—police forces and vice
crimes.  The emergence of police forces prompted no new rules limit-
ing their powers, while a new apparatus of criminal procedure was
developed to limit searches for alcohol.23  The present dichotomy be-
tween intense regulation of searches and seizures and a lack of regula-
tion on the use of force was thus present as the modern criminal
justice system was emerging.  Eighteenth and early nineteenth century
Americans feared anything resembling professional police forces.
Such organizations were akin to standing armies to former colonists
who feared mechanisms capable of thwarting the will of the people.24
Accordingly, a meager system of policing remained in American cit-
ies well after the realities of urban life required a more robust force.
The very limited role of American law enforcement officers through
the mid-nineteenth century cannot be overstated.  Custom, law, social
standing, and financial incentives converged to ensure that constables
and night watchmen did no more than was specifically required by
court orders.25  These officers did not pose the threat of modern po-
lice, who Justice Robert Jackson described as being engaged in the
“competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”26  Early officers by
contrast avoided circumstances that have led to complaints about
modern police—such as searches for incriminating evidence and phys-
ical confrontations requiring an exercise of force.27
These officers mostly served as functionaries of crime victims by
conducting investigations and prosecuting the crimes.  Victims initi-
ated the criminal process by going to magistrates and requesting a
search or arrest warrant.28  Even magistrates deferred to crime vic-
tims—the complainant merely had to claim he had probable cause for
23. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 1850–1940, 62
RUTGERS L. REV. 447 (2010).
24. EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE, GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK CITY TO
1898, at 636–38 (1999); DAVID R. JOHNSON, POLICING THE URBAN UNDERWORLD: THE IMPACT
OF CRIME ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN POLICE 1800–87, at 15 (1979); JAMES F. RICH-
ARDSON, THE NEW YORK POLICE: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1901, at 25 (1970).
25. RICHARDSON, supra note 24, at 3–22.
26. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).
27. RICHARDSON, supra note 24, at 3–22.
28. Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law History
of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 25–36 (2007).
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the warrant requested.29  Through the mid-nineteenth century, magis-
trates did not consider, as modern magistrates must,30 the facts upon
which the complainant based his suspicion and whether those facts
were sufficient for probable cause.31  Complainants were rarely de-
nied requests for warrants.  Requests were denied only in cases in
which the complainant was not considered credible.32  Officers tended
to wait for a complainant to initiate the criminal process in part be-
cause there were virtually no victimless crimes in early America.33
Legal rules also encouraged reluctance.  If an officer had probable
cause to believe an individual had committed a crime, but in fact no
crime had been committed, the officer was civilly liable for the errone-
ous arrest.34  The victim’s complaint shielded the arresting officer
from liability.
Once the warrant was issued constables began the investigatory
process.  Larceny and assault were the two most common crimes in
the first few decades of the new country.35  Constables arrested a sus-
pect accused of assault without further investigation.  A search was
29. Id. at 31–54.
30. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
31. Arcila, supra note 28, at 31–54.
32. JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW
YORK 424–25 (1944).
33. Investigations in the first half of the nineteenth century almost exclusively involved war-
rants obtained by crime victims. See OLIVER L. BARBOUR, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW
AND CRIMINAL COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 499 (2d ed. 1852); In re Special Investiga-
tions No. 228, 458 A.2d 820, 831 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (“[T]he common law of England and
of Maryland recognized the search warrant for stolen goods, but no other search warrant.”);
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 765 (1994)
(describing that “common law search warrants . . . were solely for stolen goods.”). But see A.
OAKEY HALL, A REVIEW OF THE WEBSTER CASE BY A MEMBER OF THE NEW-YORK BAR (New
York, J.S. Redfield 1850) (a rare case in which a search warrant was authorized without statutory
authority for the search of a home for clothes which a witness claimed the culprit wore).  Some
early American statutes permitted searches for smuggled items or dangerous items such as gun-
powder or diseased or infected items. Id.  By the end of the nineteenth century, warrants for
evidence of victimless crimes were recognized by commentators.  Treatise writer Joel Bishop
recognized in 1880 that search warrants were most commonly issued for stolen goods although
warrants to discover lottery tickets, intoxicating liquors, and gaming implements were beginning
to be issued as new statutes created victimless crimes. 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE; OR, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PLEADING AND EVIDENCE AND THE PRACTICE IN
CRIMINAL CASES 145 (3d ed. 1880).
34. Thomas Y. Davies, Farther and Farther from the Original Fourth Amendment: The
Recharacterization of the Right Against Self-Incrimination as a “Trial Right” in Chavez v. Marti-
nez, 70 TENN. L. REV. 987, 1004 (2003) (“The constable had neither a duty nor the authority to
investigate the possibility of uncharged crimes; in fact, in the absence of a warrant, the constable
had little more arrest authority than any other person.”).
35. Amar, supra note 33, at 765 (observing that most common search warrant application was
for stolen goods).
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required to investigate a claim of stolen goods; however, the constable
merely accompanied the victim who directed the search.36
Constables were unlikely to interrogate suspects.  Under long-
standing practice, magistrates alone took statements from the ac-
cused.37  The interrogation scene from Shakespeare’s Much Ado
About Nothing illustrates the common practice.  In the fourth act, a
magistrate, who is about to conduct an interrogation, is summoned
away and instructs the constable, Dogberry, to stand in for him.38
Dogberry protests that he is not permitted to perform this task, but at
the magistrate’s insistence, conducts a completely incompetent inter-
rogation in which the suspects openly mock him.39  Early American
statutes codified this long-standing practice of judicial interroga-
tions.40  The law of confessions during this period further made the
admissibility of any statement given to a constable unlikely.  Almost
anything a constable told a suspect could be considered a threat or
promise, undermining the voluntariness of the statement.41  Although
never adopted in the United States, an English statute forbid officers
from questioning suspects.42
36. Frisbee v. Butler, 1 Kirby 213, 213–14 (Conn. 1787).
37. 1 S. MARCH PHILLIPPS & ANDREW AMOS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 380 (Bos-
ton, Elisha G. Hammond 1839) (“Confessions of prisoners are often made in the course of their
examination before magistrates.”).
38. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING, act 4, sc. 2.
39. Id.; O. HOOD PHILLIPS, SHAKESPEARE AND THE LAWYERS 67–68 (1972) (describing Dog-
berry’s incompetent examination).
40. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 13–15 (1829); 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON
THE CRIMINAL LAW 73 n.B (Springfield, G.&C. Merriam 1836) (citing Massachusetts statute).  In
most other states in the early-nineteenth century, magistrates were, as a matter of custom, re-
quired to warn suspects of their right to silence. See, e.g., RHODOM A. GREENE & JOHN W.
LUMPKIN, THE GEORGIA JUSTICE 98–101 (Milledgeville, P.L. & B.H. Robinson 1835) (describ-
ing Georgia practice); JOHN H.B. LATROBE, THE JUSTICES’ PRACTICE UNDER THE LAWS OF
MARYLAND 317 (Baltimore, Fielding Lucas, Jr., 3d rev. ed. 1840) (describing Maryland practice).
Nineteenth-century Louisiana practice similarly required such warnings, but as trial procedures
permitted the prosecution to comment on the suspect’s pretrial silence, the warnings included
the caveat that silence may not be in the suspect’s interest. EDWARD LIVINGSTON, A SYSTEM OF
PENAL LAW FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 507 (Phila., J. Kay, Jun. & Bro., Pittsburgh, J.L. Kay
& Co. 1833) (“The magistrate shall . . . [inform the accused] that, although he is at liberty to
answer in what manner he may think proper to the questions that shall be put to him, or not to
answer them at all, yet a departure from the truth, or a refusal to answer without assigning a
sufficient reason, must operate as a circumstance against him, as well on the question of commit-
ment as of his guilt or innocence on the trial.”).
41. See Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Com-
pulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (pt. 1), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 158
n.300 (1992) (collecting nineteenth century voluntariness cases).
42. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 749
n.574 (1999) (observing that officers were not permitted to interrogate suspects at the time the
Bill of Rights was drafted).
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Legal constraints were but one limitation on constables and watch-
men.  Socially, the men who patrolled early American cities were not
respected.  James Otis referred to them as “petty officers” in his
famed argument against the writs of assistance in 1761.43  Often, citi-
zens were compelled to serve as officers, though even those of little
means were able to relieve themselves of this duty.44  Law enforce-
ment was not a career, but a burden on the lower classes.  Officers had
day jobs and the vigorous enforcement of their duties interfered with
their primary source of income.  Any arrest required the officer to
appear before a judge, taking time that could have been devoted to
the officer’s more lucrative employment.45  These meager citizens,
who were insufficient in number, had little incentive to risk their lives
or even expend their energies to investigate crimes and suspicious per-
sons or quell riots, brawls, or fist fights.46  With almost no incentive to
protect the towns they were guarding, these officers were ineffective
and posed little threat to liberty.
Big-city concerns like riots and unsolved crimes, however, forced
American cities to rethink their fears of standing armies.47  London
created a police organization in 1829 that would become the model for
43. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 57 (1970); T. H. Breen, Subjecthood and Citizenship: The
Context of James Otis’s Radical Critique of John Locke, 71 NEW ENG. Q. 378, 378 (1998).
44. GEORGE WILLIAM EDWARDS, NEW YORK AS AN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY MUNICIPALITY
1731–1776, at 323 (1917) (observing that “[s]erving on this watch or securing a substitute was
undoubtedly an onerous task for the poorer New Yorkers”).
45. 3 I.N. PHELPS STOKES, THE ICONOGRAPHY OF MANHATTAN ISLAND 643–44 (1998).
46. See LISA KELLER, TRIUMPH OF ORDER: DEMOCRACY & PUBLIC SPACE IN NEW YORK
AND LONDON 163 (2009) (describing recognition of increasing manpower when first modern
police department was created in New York City); Davies, supra note 42, at 641.
47. There is substantial agreement that nineteenth century riots produced modern police
forces. See ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA,
1800–1880, at 119–21 (1989) (“Between 1837 and 1850, as the determination of the judiciary to
intensify state prosecution and the punishment of rioters grew, support for expanding and im-
proving the city’s police force increased.”); SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE
REFORM: THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONALISM 4 (1977) (contending that modern police
forces were developed as a “consequence of an unprecedented wave of civil disorder that swept
the nation between the 1830s and the 1870s”); JOHNSON, STREET JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 8–9
(comparing the rise in strong policing to other historical sequences of events); Robert Liebman
& Michael Polen, Perspectives on Policing in Nineteenth Century America, 2 SOC. SCI. HIST. 346
(1978) (reviewing scholarship on the creation of early police forces). But see ERIC H. MONK-
KONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 1860–1920, at 56 (1981) (contending that cities seized the
opportunity to create a mechanism of social control, but were not motivated by any particular
events); EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE, GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK TO 1898,
at 637–38 (1999) (attributing willingness of New Yorkers to finally accept a new police force to
media coverage of a brutal unsolved murder); AMY GILMAN SREBNICK, THE MYSTERIOUS
DEATH OF MARY ROGERS: SEX AND CULTURE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 87 (1997)
(explaining how a high-profile murder shifted “the tone and direction of earlier debates over
urban crime and punishment”).
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American police forces.48  The hallmarks of these entities were a hier-
archical military-style command structure and a sufficient number of
full-time officers to control crowds and conduct criminal investiga-
tions without relying on militia, posse, or private citizens.49  Law en-
forcement went from a part-time requirement imposed on citizens to a
career in which officers could rise in the ranks.  With greater social
standing and incentives to aggressively assert their powers, officers si-
multaneously became better protectors of their communities and a
real threat to them.
In Philadelphia, Boston, and New York City, police departments
based on the London model began to develop in the mid-nineteenth
century.50 Citizens’ fears of these new organizations quickly emerged
and police brutality became a frequent concern.51  Some reformers
sought mechanisms to limit the amount of force officers could use or
the circumstances justifying the use of force.  In New York City, for
instance, there were proposals to limit the use of police force to that
necessary to effect an arrest or protect the life or safety of the of-
ficer.52  Other proposals sought to shorten the length of police clubs to
fourteen inches.  Eighteen-inch locust clubs, standard issue in New
York City through the nineteenth century, were frequently lethal.53
Yet another proposal sought to prevent officers from carrying brass
knuckles, nunchucks, or other non-conventional weapons capable of
inflicting substantial injury.54
Despite the reasonableness of these suggested limits, they were all
thwarted by claims that such measures would give criminals an advan-
tage.  Progressives of the late nineteenth century contended that it
was not police violence itself, but inappropriate uses of police violence
that was problematic.55  Hot-headed officers who pursued personal
vendettas or mistreated unlucky citizens in their path were criticized
by all reformers.56  But for Progressives, unnecessary violence against
48. JOHNSON, URBAN UNDERWORLD, supra note 24, at 9. See generally DAVID BENTLEY, EN-
GLISH CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1998) (describing the creation of the
London police force in 1829).
49. JOHNSON, URBAN UNDERWORLD, supra note 24, at 15.
50. See generally ROGER LANE, POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON, 1822–1885 (1967); ALLEN
STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880 (1989);
RICHARDSON, supra note 24.
51. JOHNSON, STREET JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 4–5.
52. Id. at 88–89.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 99.
55. JAY STUART BERMAN, POLICE ADMINISTRATION AND PROGRESSIVE REFORM: THEODORE
ROOSEVELT AS POLICE COMMISSIONER OF NEW YORK (1987).
56. JOHNSON, STREET JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 91.
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the criminal element was not only tolerable, but a positive good.
Teddy Roosevelt, the New York City Police Commissioner in 1895,
was the leading advocate for this position.  He believed that physical
force encouraged respect for an officer’s authority and deterred crimi-
nal activity.  He encouraged his officers to use their clubs liberally
against the criminal element.57  At the same time, however, he fought
to obtain civil service reforms that prevented unqualified officers from
receiving appointments and, more importantly, to keep the patronage
system from interfering with discipline of officers who misused
force.58  Progressive civil service reforms in other cities similarly em-
boldened police.  In New Orleans, new protocols for hiring and firing
in 1886 led to more arrests and fewer social services being performed
by officers.59  These social services had been used to placate legiti-
macy concerns.60
Judge William Gaynor was elected Mayor of New York City in 1910
due in part to his concerns about police brutality.  He concluded that
Progressive reformers believed that society could “be reformed and
better made . . . instead of being debased, by the policeman’s club and
the fireman’s axe.”61  Interestingly, Gaynor’s stance against police vio-
lence did not survive the political or social realities of his term as
mayor.  His anti-brutality orders that limited the use of clubs and for-
bid acts of unnecessary violence were withdrawn after opponents of
the regulation blamed an increase in crime on the policies.62
One historian describing Seattle in the years just before Prohibition
observed that the “Queen City was proud of its pugilistic police, and
the cage in the morning was often crowded with underworld charac-
ters sporting blackened eyes and split lips.”63  In 1934, New York City
Police Commissioner Lewis Valentine presented a lineup of well-
dressed mobsters to the press and brazenly told them that such men
should not be brought to the jail in this condition—he instructed of-
ficers to “muss up” such men.64  “Men like him should be mussed up!
Blood should be smeared all over his velvet collar,” he told the report-
57. Id. at 88.
58. Id. at 56.
59. DENNIS C. ROUSEY, POLICING THE SOUTHERN CITY: NEW ORLEANS 1805–1889, at 173–96
(1996).
60. Id.
61. LATELY THOMAS, THE MAYOR WHO MASTERED NEW YORK: THE LIFE AND OPINIONS OF
WILLIAM J. GAYNOR (1969).
62. JOHNSON, STREET JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 100–06.
63. PHILIP METCALF, WHISPERING WIRES: THE TRAGIC TALE OF AN AMERICAN BOOTLEG-
GER 6 (2007).
64. ARTHUR NASH, NEW YORK CITY GANGLAND 29 (2010).
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ers.65  Like police chiefs of his generation, Valentine publicly and
unapologetically supported third-degree interrogation tactics.66
As police brutality was coming to be grudgingly accepted as a nec-
essary, perhaps even appropriate, aspect of modern policing, residents
in certain parts of the country were getting a preview of a type of
police intrusion that would not be tolerated.  States in the Northeast
and Midwest experimented in the mid-nineteenth century with ver-
sions of prohibitory laws that would be imposed on the entire nation
in the 1920s.67  Police forces were not well developed in many of the
cities and towns subject to these new laws.68  Much of the enforcement
therefore fell on private citizens, members of the Temperance Watch-
men, who would petition courts to search their neighbors’ homes for
liquor.  Fear of their zeal prompted legislatures to require more of
applicants for liquor warrants than was required of applicants seeking
any other type of search warrant.69  Judges then dismissed convictions
in cases involving inadequately supported search warrant applica-
tions.70  Thus, for a particular type of investigation—liquor searches—
65. Id.
66. Phillip Messing, When Cops Were Robbers: The Early Days of NYPD, N.Y. POST, Apr. 12,
2015.
67. William Blackwood & Sons, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine 211 (1867) (identifying the
13 states to adopt Prohibition in the mid-nineteenth century); see also Paul Aaron & David
Musto, Temperance and Prohibition in America: A Historical Overview, in ALCOHOL AND PUB-
LIC POLICY: BEYOND THE SHADOW OF PROHIBITION 141 (Mark H. Moore & Dean R. Gerstein
eds., 1981).  Prohibition did not extend to the southeast in the nineteenth century because of the
linkage between the Temperance Movement and the Abolition Movement, though Prohibition
nearly succeeded in parts of the antebellum South, such as Kentucky. See Thomas H. Appleton,
Jr., “Moral Suasion Has Its Day”: From Temperance to Prohibition in Antebellum Kentucky, in
A MYTHIC LAND APART: REASSESSING SOUTHERNERS AND THEIR HISTORY 19–42 (John David
Smith & Thomas H. Appleton, Jr. eds., 1997).  Ironically, Prohibition then found some of its
strongest support in the south in the early twentieth century as the Ku Klux Klan, with its strong-
est (though not exclusive) support in the southeast, strongly supported Prohibition. KATHLEEN
DROWNE, SPIRITS OF DEFIANCE: NATIONAL PROHIBITION AND JAZZ AGE LITERATURE,
1920–1933, at 20 (2005); Kris Durocher & Amy Louise Wood, Ku Klux Klan, Second
(1915–1944), in 24 NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOUTHERN CULTURE 228–29 (Thomas C. Holt &
Laurie B. Green eds., 2013).
68. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLICE SCIENCE 10 (William G. Bailey ed., 2d ed. 1995).
69. Ann-Marie Szymanski, Dry Compulsions: Prohibition and the Creation of State-Level
Agencies, J. POL’Y HIST. (1999) (discussing creation of Temperance Watchmen in New York and
Massachusetts to investigate illegal liquor possession);  Matthew C. Moen & Kenneth T. Palmer,
Maine: Which Way Should Life Be?, in PRAYERS IN THE PRECINCTS: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT IN
THE 1998 ELECTIONS 272 (John Clifford Green et al., eds., 2000) (describing the creation of the
“Watchmen of Temperance” in Maine “whose sole purpose was to ferret out information about
hidden liquor stocks for public officials”).
70. See State v. Staples, 37 Me. 228, 230 (1854) (arresting conviction as complaint authorizing
search for alcohol was found to be inadequate since it failed to describe basis of complainant’s
belief of location of liquor); Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. 1, 6 (1854) (discussing action to recover
value of liquor seized on the basis of improper complaint, which was analogous to modern
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a number of courts clearly embraced an early form of the exclusionary
rule.
Late nineteenth century Progressive reformers were able to thwart
efforts to limit or externally control the use of force by police by en-
suring the public that only the “criminal element” would encounter
the policeman’s baton.71  Those endeavoring to rid the nation of alco-
hol could make no promise that enforcement efforts would fall only
on the undesirables.72  Prohibition transformed a large percentage of
otherwise law-abiding citizens into criminals overnight.73  Alcohol was
enjoyed at every strata of society—a fact that federal and state pro-
hibitory laws did not change.
Nineteenth century prohibitory laws created new mechanisms for
obtaining search warrants and introduced penalties for violating these
mechanisms.  Probable cause went from a pleading requirement to an
evidentiary threshold that applicants for warrants were required to
satisfy.  The exclusionary rule was introduced in many jurisdictions as
courts recognized Prohibition’s zealous enforcers were not satisfying
the new alcohol-specific requirements for searches.
Efforts to control drinking in the United States began with cam-
paigns for moderation.  Long after reformers shifted toward advocat-
ing for a ban on alcohol, the name “Temperance Movement”
remained.74  In the late 1840s, Neal Dow of Portland, Maine, became
the most prominent advocate of a law that prohibited selling—or pos-
session with the intent to sell—intoxicating beverages.75  Like a num-
search warrant); People v. Toynbee, 11 How. Pr. 289, 330 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (“The complaint
[analogous to the modern affidavit in support of a search warrant] is a substitute for an indict-
ment . . . and requires at least as much particularity.”); State v. Twenty-Five Packages of Liquor,
38 Vt. 387, 390–92 (1866) (recognizing that action to forfeit liquor could be quashed when search
warrant in insufficiently particular).
71. WILBUR R. MILLER, COPS AND BOBBIES: POLICE AUTHORITY IN NEW YORK AND
LONDON, 1830–1870, at 80 (1973).
72. But see MCGIRR, supra note 10 (though those enforcing the law obviously would not ex-
pressly identify which groups Prohibition enforcement would fall upon, practically racial minori-
ties and poorer Americans bore the brunt of such efforts).
73. Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative
State, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 21 (2006).
74. JOHN A. KROUT, THE ORIGINS OF PROHIBITION 266 (1925); LORI D. GINZBERG, WOMEN
IN THE WORK OF BENEVOLENCE: MORALITY, POLITICS, AND CLASS IN THE UNITED STATES
98–132 (1990); Jed Dannenbaum, The Origins of Temperance Activism and Militancy Among
American Women, 15 J. SOC. HIST. 235, 239–40 (1981) (explaining Temperance Movement’s shift
from moral suasion to prohibition in terms of gender).
75. NEAL DOW, THE REMINISCENCES OF NEAL DOW: RECOLLECTIONS OF EIGHTY YEARS 24
(1898).  General James Appleton made the attempt in Massachusetts and his family would insist
that he had not received his due for the later success in Maine. See DANIEL F. APPLETON, THE
ORIGIN OF THE MAINE LAW AND OF PROHIBITORY LEGISLATION WITH A BRIEF MEMOIR OF
JAMES APPLETON (1886).
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ber of states on the Atlantic coast, Maine had a seaport with many
businesses that catered to drunken sailors, but it also had a considera-
bly more conservative inland population where Dow’s prohibition
message gained traction.76  From the country’s earliest days, individ-
ual localities had been able to choose whether to permit alcohol and
the circumstances under which it could be sold.77
Dow was able to cobble together a coalition of Maine legislators to
pass the nation’s first statewide prohibition law in 1846.78  This law
was ineffective because it lacked a mechanism enabling searches for
what Dow labeled “demon rum.”79  Prosecutions under this law fre-
quently failed for lack of physical evidence.  Temperance Watchmen—
a group of private citizens that volunteered to enforce the liquor
laws—often testified to witnessing forbidden sales, but their testimony
was frequently discounted due to concerns about their credibility or
an unwillingness to enforce the liquor law on the basis of such bare
assertions.80
The effort to permit discovery of tangible proof of liquor law viola-
tions revealed Maine’s internal conflict on prohibition and previewed
the nation’s split personality on the issue seven decades later.  Dow
returned to the Maine Legislature in 1849 with a bill that would allow
a search warrant for liquor on the basis of a complaint signed by three
citizens who claimed to have probable cause that liquor would be dis-
covered.81  Such a procedure for seeking a warrant seems, by modern
standards, contrary to constitutional principles.82  None of these com-
plainants were required to explain the basis of their accusations, they
merely had to allege that they indeed had, to their own satisfaction, an
adequate foundation for asserting that liquor would be discovered.
The mechanism for obtaining the warrant Dow proposed was, how-
ever, by the standards of the mid-nineteenth century, quite demand-
ing.  Search warrants until the latter half of the nineteenth century
were almost exclusively for stolen goods.  Applicants for search war-
rants merely had to allege that a crime had been committed and that
76. FRANK L. BYRNE, PROPHET OF PROHIBITION: NEAL DOW AND HIS CRUSADE 37 (1961).
77. See generally KROUT, supra note 74 (tracing history of prohibition from colonial era to
enactment of Maine Law).
78. HENRY STEPHEN CLUBB, THE MAINE LIQUOR LAW: ITS ORIGIN, HISTORY, AND RESULTS
(1856).
79. Neal Dow himself later recognized that without the search mechanism, his efforts would
have been doomed to failure. See Prohibitory Laws of Maine, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1896, at 5.
80. THOMAS BYRNE, PROPHET OF PROHIBITION: NEAL DOW AND HIS CRUSADE 37 (1961).
81. Id. at 42–43.
82. See Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933) (finding a mere allegation insufficient
for search warrant).
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they had probable cause to believe evidence of the crime could be
found in the location identified.83  The warrant application process
Dow proposed required, by contrast, three people to swear that they
had probable cause.  Unlike a larceny victim, however, an applicant
for a search warrant for liquor was usually unable to swear that a
crime had in fact occurred.84
Maine legislators who supported the essentially unenforceable pro-
hibitory law in 1846 were less willing in 1849 to support a provision
that allowed searches necessary to enforce the liquor laws.  A number
of legislators in pro-temperance districts opposed a law that would
enable both effective enforcement of the liquor laws and abuses from
zealots willing to play fast and loose in their efforts to discover alco-
hol.  These legislators therefore struck a deal with Governor John
Dana who agreed to veto the bill they felt politically compelled to
support.85
The constitutional problem with Dow’s proposal, from a mid-nine-
teenth century perspective, was the number of searches that became
possible.  Search warrants for stolen goods were finite in number as
only victims of missing items could seek them.  However, any citizen
could allege liquor could be discovered in any number of homes.86
Governor Dana observed that for a warrant to discover stolen items,
there must be a pre-existing fact, not merely suspect, but known to
the complainant, to wit: the loss of the goods; and when such a fact
exists, the person suffering the loss, in instituting the search, will
give to it, only that direction which the circumstances may indicate,
as most likely to result in recovery of the property.87
Governor Dana recognized that there were victimless crimes prior to
this new liquor law for which applicants could seek warrants—and
like the liquor searches, there was no way for the warrant applicant to
be sure that a crime had been committed.88  In Maine, it was illegal to
83. See Arcila, supra note 28, at 17–44.
84. Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth?: The Framers Preserved Common-Law
Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—“Fourth Amendment Reasonableness is Only
a Modern, Destructive Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 51, 103 (2010) (describing the
crime-in-fact requirement of early state criminal warrants).
85. This inference is supported by the fact that a similar development occurred with the pas-
sage of the liquor law of 1851, which was successful.  Several members of the legislature who
voted for the bill counseled then-Governor John Hubbard to veto it, noting that they could not
have voted for it and retained their seats.  They advised him to follow the course of his predeces-
sor. See DOW, supra note 75, at 340–43.  Neal Dow also observed that Governor Dana had
taken the “counsel of some of the leaders in his party” in vetoing the bill. Id. at 320.
86. ACTS AND RESOLVES PASSED BY THE THIRTIETH LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MAINE
A.D. 1850, at 298 (Augusta, William T. Johnson 1850).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 297–98.
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store gunpowder in an unsafe manner and town elders could seek a
warrant to ensure that this law was not being violated.89  Governor
Dana acknowledged that this law existed, but concluded that such
searches were rare enough to not pose a risk to liberty.90  Though
Dana did not mention them, Maine’s statutes in 1849 also permitted
warrants to be obtained to search for pornography, prostitutes, and
gambling instruments.91  With no full-time police forces, or even part-
time police forces with an incentive to conduct these searches—and in
a world with no private society aimed at stamping out vice generally—
the ability to seek these warrants existed on paper, but did not occur
in practice.
The liberty of early Americans rested in the infrequency of govern-
ment intervention, not the legitimacy of its intervention.  The mid-
nineteenth century criminal justice system protected citizens from
widespread searches, not unjustified searches.  Neal Dow’s proposal
of 1849, with his Temperance Watchmen standing at the ready to seek
warrants, guaranteed a large number of alcohol searches.  Throughout
the nation’s effort to enforce prohibition, whether alone at the state-
level in the 1850s or at the national level in the 1920s, opponents of
liquor searches were of two minds.  Some opposed all liquor searches,
while others opposed merely unjustified searches.92  Governor Dana’s
veto of Dow’s proposed search mechanism would have appealed to
both camps.  Practically speaking, nothing at the time required magis-
trates to test the reliability of a complainant’s suspicion.  Dow’s 1849
proposal did nothing to improve the reliability of searches and would
have exponentially increased the number of potential searches.  Gov-
ernor Dana’s veto prevented dragnet searches that were the concern
89. One of the earliest statutes of Maine provided that a search warrant could be obtained by
a selectman of the town to investigate the possibility that gunpowder was being stored contrary
to the regulations of the town.  An Act for the Prevention of Damage by Fire, and the Safe
Keeping of Gun Powder, ch. 25, § 5, 1821 Me. Laws 112, 114 (Brunswick, J. Griffin 1821); JOHN
MAURICE O’BRIEN, THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE TOWN OFFICER, AS CONTAINED IN THE
STATUTES OF MAINE (Hallowell, Glazier & Co. 2d ed. 1824).  Statutes regulating the possession
of gunpowder in early American states were somewhat common. See Saul Cornell, A Well-
Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 510–13
(2004).
90. ACTS AND RESOLVES, supra note 86, at 298.
91. ME. REV. STAT., tit. XII, ch. 160, §§ 18, 20, 39 (1841).
92. Justice William Anderson of the Mississippi Supreme Court is an excellent example of a
prohibitionist who insisted on searches consistent with state constitutional prohibitions on unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.  In a dissent, he rejected a proposal to allow an exception from
the state’s prohibitory laws for a “medicine” that was 95% alcohol because he argued that such
loopholes would undermine the enforcement of Prohibition.  At the same time, he required
courts in his home state to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence to deter unlawful searches. See
discussion at infra notes 201–205 and accompanying text.
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of mid-nineteenth civil libertarians.  Implicitly, he recognized that the
protections of the mid-nineteenth century warrant application process
did nothing to guard against a single unjustified search, but would pre-
vent widespread searches, whether justified or not.
The nineteenth century warrant application process, that required a
victim’s assurance that a crime had occurred, certainly could not sur-
vive modern policing, vice crimes, and white-collar crimes.  By the
twentieth century police had the manpower and incentive to conduct
searches to discover evidence other than stolen goods.  A mechanism
to justify such searches, other than a victim’s affirmation that a crime
had occurred, was obviously required to search for evidence of vic-
timless crimes.  Such a mechanism was created in mid-nineteenth-cen-
tury Maine with statewide Prohibition.  In his zeal to stamp out liquor
consumption, Dow was required to develop a new type of protection
that would at least satisfy the objections of civil libertarians.  In doing
so, Dow introduced the modern warrant application procedure to
state criminal cases.
In 1851, Dow returned to the Maine Legislature with a new search
provision.  Like the 1849 proposal, it required three citizens to swear
that illegally possessed alcohol could be discovered at the location in
question.  Unlike the previous bill, however, it required at least one of
the applicants to provide the facts upon which he concluded that alco-
hol had been sold on the premises.93  While a number of treatises in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century required applicants
to provide the facts upon which they concluded probable cause ex-
isted, evidence of historical practice reveals probable cause was noth-
ing more than a pleading requirement—something that applicants
merely had to allege.94  Despite the actual practice, a bill that required
applicants to explain the factual basis of their suspicions would be
comfortable to any lawyer who had read Blackstone’s Commentaries
on the Laws of England, or any number of treatises that required mag-
istrates to consider the factual basis for an applicant’s assertion of
suspicion.95
93. An Act for the Suppression of Drinking Houses and Tippling Shops, ch. 211, § 11, 1851
Me. Laws 210, 214–15.
94. See Arcila, supra note 28, at 17–44.
95. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 290–91 (London,
1826); 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 150 (London, E. Rider
new ed. 1800); 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 130–31
(Thomas Leach ed., London, His Majesty’s Printer 6th ed. 1824).  Blackstone’s version of the
warrant application procedure could well have been familiar to members of the Maine Legisla-
ture with legal training as one of the earliest American versions of Blackstone’s treatise was
published in Portland and Maine-specific treatises in the first half of the nineteenth century cited
Blackstone’s warrant standard. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, KNT., COMMENTARIES ON THE
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Including this requirement in a revised statute authorizing liquor
searches strongly suggests that Mainers, or at least their representa-
tives, required more protection from unlawful vice crime searches
than from searches for stolen goods.  By the time the bill passed both
houses of the legislature, John Hubbard had replaced John Dana in
the Maine Governor’s Mansion.96  Dow did not simply reintroduce his
previously unsuccessful bill once the new pro-prohibition97 governor
was inaugurated.98  He sought the assistance of an eminent lawyer in
Portland to help him modify the rejected version and, for the first time
in United States criminal procedure, a proposed criminal procedure
statute expressly required a magistrate to second-guess a complain-
ant’s conclusion that he had enough suspicion to initiate a criminal
proceeding.99  The legislative history of this statute suggests it was in-
tended to modify actual practice.  Because of concerns unique to li-
quor searches, advocates of such searches were forced to impose
requirements on the warrant process that were unknown to other
types of warrant requests.
LAWS OF ENGLAND (Portland, Thomas B. Wait 1807); JEREMIAH PERLEY, THE MAINE JUSTICE
75–76 (Hallowell, Goodale, Glazier 1823) (stating standard from Blackstone).  I am grateful to
Chris Livesay, who allowed me to spend a day going through these and other original nine-
teenth-century treatises he has collected in his Brunswick, Maine, law office.
96. DAVID G. GOLD, AN EXEMPLARY WHIG: EDWARD KENT AND THE WHIG DISPOSITION IN
AMERICAN POLITICS AND LAW 158 (2012).
97. WILLIAM G. GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 1852–56, at 47 (1987).
98. See MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY: JACKSO-
NIAN POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR 747 (1999) (discussing John Hubbard’s sup-
port for Maine’s prohibitory law, which came to be known as the Maine Law).
99. See DOW, supra note 75, at 35 (“Having completed [the bill] to my own satisfaction, I
submitted it to Edward Fox [who] . . .  suggested a few changes, principally on technical points,
which I accepted.”).  John Neal, who was Neal Dow’s cousin, stated that in drafting the Maine
Law, Dow “had the help of a legal personage, for whom we profess to feel a sincere regard, in
preparing the very portions which are most offensive and preposterous, and which mainly distin-
guish it from the old law.”  John Neal, The Liquor Law of Maine, MAINE EXPOSITOR, Aug. 31,
1853, at 2.  He continued, “What those are, will be seen hereafter, as we proceed with the
‘searching analysis’ we have in our mind.” Id.  Given Dow’s reference to Fox’s “technical assis-
tance,” the reference is not difficult to decode, but subsequent writings from Neal would clarify
any ambiguity.  John Neal would quickly grow considerably less charitable toward Fox when he,
one week later, specifically named him, noting that was “the gentleman who ranks among one of
the putative fathers of the Maine Liquor Law, and is rather disposed to glory in the co-partner-
ship, though he thinks it too merciful.”  John Neal, Mr. Neal’s Reply, MAINE EXPOSITOR, Sept.
14, 1853, at 1.  These claims were made public because John Neal and Neal Dow had gotten into
a very public feud after John, who supported Neal’s efforts to pass the Maine Law, represented
Kitty Kentuck, the proprietor of a house of ill-repute in Portland on a charge that she had vio-
lated the state’s new liquor law.  Neal Dow accused his cousin of having more than a lawyer-
client relationship with the known madam.  John Neal, The Liquor Law of Maine—No. 2,
MAINE EXPOSITOR, Sept. 7, 1853, at 1; JOHN NEAL, WANDERING RECOLLECTIONS OF A SOME-
WHAT BUSY LIFE 370–72 (1869).
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An 1853 legislative modification to Maine’s liquor search provision
appears to have been an effort to allow applicants to obtain search
warrants for liquor as easily as theft victims obtained warrants to look
for stolen goods.100  Under this version of the law, a magistrate could
permit the search of a dwelling for alcohol if “by the testimony of
witnesses upon oath . . . there is reasonable grounds for believing”
that unlawfully possessed liquor could be found in the house to be
searched.101  Opponents of the bill alleged this version of the search
provision allowed a mere allegation to be sufficient for a search.102
Supporters contended the new version did not change the law and
pointed critics to a new provision that imposed a one-year jail term
upon anyone who committed perjury in the process of seeking author-
ization to search for liquor.103
Whatever the actual motives of the sponsors of this new bill, Tem-
perance Watchmen quickly sought to demonstrate that a mere allega-
tion of unlawful liquor possession was sufficient to obtain a warrant.
They began to apply for warrants omitting any facts supporting their
allegations that liquor was believed to be present in the homes they
asked to search.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine rejected the
argument implicitly made by the Watchmen that a mere allegation
that probable cause existed was sufficient.104  The previous version of
the statute required a specific type of proof—applicants had to de-
scribe witnessing an unlawful sale of alcohol.  The court held that the
1851 version created a standard that present-day lawyers would recog-
nize as the standard for establishing probable cause.105  No specific
fact had to be identified, but sworn facts had to be offered to a magis-
trate that would warrant a person’s belief that the alleged crime had
been committed and evidence of the crime could be discovered in the
place to be searched.106  Critically, this requirement existed only for
liquor searches.
100. REPORT OF JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON SO MUCH OF THE ADDRESS OF THE GOVER-
NOR AS RELATES TO THE ACT FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF DRINKING HOUSES AND TIPPLING
SHOPS, 23 DOCUMENTS PRINTED BY ORDER OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MAINE 26
(1853).
101. Id. (reciting bill).
102. Id. at 27.
103. Id. at 4 (responding to criticisms, proponents noted that to search a dwelling, “evidence
of witnesses [had to] be given in writing, on oath, filed with the magistrate, sufficient to show
that there is good ground to believe that spirituous and intoxicating liquors are kept or deposited
therein”).  Throughout the 1850s, there is no evidence in the appellate reports or newspapers of
Maine indicating that anyone was prosecuted for perjury under this statute.
104. State v. Staples, 37 Me. 228 (1854); State v. Spirituous Liquors, 39 Me. 262 (1855).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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As important as the new legislative limits on liquor searches were,
the courts played a far more substantial role in imposing limits on the
efforts of Temperance Watchmen.  When magistrates granted war-
rants on the basis of applications that lacked a statement explaining
the basis for believing an illegal liquor sale had occurred, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine arrested the judgment of conviction, effec-
tively dismissing the case.107  The legal instrument that allowed a
search for alcohol was identified as a complaint and if the prerequi-
sites for the complaint were not satisfied, appellate courts in Maine
regarded the entire prosecution as flawed.108  This was an early ver-
sion of the exclusionary rule.  Even though this version of the exclu-
sionary rule only applied to searches initiated with search warrants,
practically, this was the only mechanism needed to deter liquor
searches conducted without adequate suspicion.  In a world prior to
professional police forces, Temperance Watchmen, acting as private
citizens, would have been trespassing if they conducted searches with-
out judicial authorization.
Maine was not an anomaly in its experimentation with prohibition
or its judicial efforts to limit those searches.  Most states throughout
the Midwest and Northeast adopted prohibitory statutes similar to the
one Dow navigated through the Maine Legislature.109  State courts in
jurisdictions adopting the prohibitory laws required complainants
seeking to search for liquor to explain the basis of their suspicions and
dismissed convictions when search warrants were issued without this
prerequisite.110
A new body of search and seizure law developed in state courts in
the 1850s, but it dealt only with searches for liquor.  In 1961, every
court in America would be required to apply these rules for searches
and seizures to efforts to discover evidence of any type of crime.  Im-
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Though one tends to think of the Southeast as having the most restrictive alcohol laws in
the twentieth century, an overlap between the leadership of the Prohibition, Women’s Suffrage,
and Abolition movements prevented southern states from embracing the new anti-liquor laws.
JOE L. COKER, LIQUOR AND THE LOST CAUSE: SOUTHERN EVANGELICALS AND THE PROHIBI-
TION MOVEMENT 2 (2007) (“During the antebellum period, the temperance movement enjoyed
great success in the northeastern United States, and during the 1850s, more than a dozen north-
ern states enacted statewide bans on liquor.  But because of the temperance movements Yankee
origins—not to mention its strong ties to the abolition movement—it received a tepid reception
in the antebellum South.”).
110. State v. Twenty-Five Packages of Liquor, 38 Vt. 387 (1866) (recognizing that forfeiture
action could be quashed for failure to have a sufficiently particular search warrant); Fisher v.
McGirr, 1 Gray 1 (Mass. 1854) (action for value of seized liquor permitted on the basis of an
insufficient search warrant); People v. Toynbee, 11 How. Pr. 289 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855).
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portantly, liquor searches, not unjustified acts of violence by police,
inspired nineteenth-century America to place new limits on police.
III. EXCLUSIONARY RULE GAINS ACCEPTANCE DURING
NATIONAL PROHIBITION
The connections between the exclusionary rule and Prohibition are
not understood.  The history of criminal procedure tends to be viewed
entirely through the lens of the Supreme Court.111  Thus, the pivotal
role Prohibition played in the acceptance of the exclusionary rule is
overlooked if one simply focuses on Supreme Court opinions.  Look-
ing at state court decisions, one discovers that the exclusionary rule
gained acceptance in the states only because of Prohibition.  In 1961,
Mapp v. Ohio borrowed this rule as an emergency measure to regulate
police engaged in a very different sort of misconduct.
While the Supreme Court famously adopted a version of the exclu-
sionary rule in 1886 in Boyd v. United States,112 the rationale of this
decision was quite idiosyncratic and had very limited relevance for
criminal prosecutions.113 Weeks v. United States, decided in 1914,114
would put the federal version of the rule on a footing recognizable to
present-day lawyers, but neither Boyd nor Weeks had much of an im-
pact on the American criminal justice system.115  The federal criminal
docket represented only a tiny portion of the prosecutions occurring
at the turn of the twentieth century.116  To understand police conduct
in the early twentieth century—and the effect of judicial efforts to reg-
ulate it—one must look to state courts.  Until National Prohibition,
state courts did not follow the lead of the Supreme Court in adopting
the exclusionary rule.  It was only with fears of police aggressively en-
forcing the new liquor laws that state courts found Boyd or Weeks
worth embracing.
111. See Weisberg, supra note 1, at 911.
112. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
113. Thomas Y. Davies, An Account of Mapp v. Ohio that Misses the Larger Exclusionary
Rule Story, 4 OHIO ST. L. J. 619, 622–23 (2007) (“The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule first
appeared in a cryptic statement in the 1886 decision in Boyd v. United States[.]”); William J.
Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L. J. 393, 422–23 (1995)
(describing the collapse of the doctrine in Boyd within 20 years of the decision).
114. 232 U.S. 341 (1914).
115. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth?, supra note 84, at 119–21 (describing how Weeks
moved the exclusionary rule closer to the modern standard).
116. MITCHEL P. ROTH, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 172 (2d ed. 2010).
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Boyd v. United States is traditionally (and falsely) viewed as the ear-
liest example of the exclusionary rule in the United States.117  The
prosecution in Boyd sought and obtained a subpoena for an invoice of
the contents of a ship to demonstrate that required duties had not
been paid.118  The Supreme Court concluded that the seizure of these
papers was unreasonable.119  Much like the Fifth Amendment pro-
tected citizens against self-incrimination, Boyd concluded the Fourth
Amendment ensured the government could not seize an individual’s
books or records to incriminate him.120  Under this rationale, no de-
gree of suspicion would allow the government to obtain recorded in-
formation.  This decision therefore insulated businesses from
revealing financial misdeeds, but did not survive the rise of the regula-
tory state in the early twentieth century.121  However, the idea that
constitutional values sometimes required the sacrifice of reliable evi-
dence survived the turn of the century.
Weeks involved a warrantless entry into the defendant’s home
where evidence of illegal gambling was discovered.122  The Court held
the method in which the incriminating evidence was discovered—not
the mere recovery of incriminating evidence as in Boyd—precluded
its admission in a criminal trial.
Boyd and Weeks were different than the mid-nineteenth century
mechanism that limited the Temperance Watchmen.  Each decision
applied to the fruits of searches for any type of crime, though Boyd
appears to have been limited to written documents.123  Neither Boyd
nor Weeks caught on in the states, at least not until there was a second
effort to enforce a prohibitory law—this time, a national effort with
117. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth, supra note 84, at 58 (“The conventional account of
Fourth Amendment history was initially sketched out in the 1886 decision Boyd v. United States
. . . .”).
118. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 636.
119. Id. at 638.
120. Id. at 621.
121. Stuntz, supra note 113, at 428 (noting that if the protections of Boyd had been extended
to corporations, “the modern regulatory state would have been dead almost before it was
born”).
122. 232 U.S. 341.
123. Boyd rested on the Court’s view that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments ran into each
other.  116 U.S. at 630.  Only documents created by the defendant would involve a conscious act
of self-incrimination.  Commentators often describe Boyd as specifically providing privacy in
documents, rather than merely providing protection in one’s private possessions.  Of these peo-
ple, some clearly had an interest in accenting the constitutional protection for documents. See
Senator Bob Packwood, “Dear Diary—Can You Be Used Against Me?”: The Fifth Amendment
and Diaries, 35 B.C. L. REV. 965, 966 (1994) (noting that in “Boyd v. United States, the Court
held that the Fifth Amendment protected an individual from compelled production of all per-
sonal documents”).
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large, highly organized police departments in place to carry out liquor
searches.124
The Eighteenth Amendment permitting Congress to regulate the
possession and sale of alcohol was passed on January 17, 1919 and the
Volstead Act criminalizing possession with the intent to sell went into
effect one year later.125  Many similar state laws had gone into effect
in the 1910s, some even earlier.126  Surprisingly, some states passed
such laws despite booming legal distilling operations.  In 1909, Tennes-
see passed its prohibitory law, forcing the Jack Daniel’s distillery to
move to St. Louis and the George Dickel distillery to move to Ken-
tucky.127  Kentucky, by far the country’s most prominent producer of
whiskey, adopted a prohibitory law in 1919.128
By 1930, eighteen states had adopted a generic version of the exclu-
sionary rule.129  Only Iowa embraced the rule prior to twentieth cen-
124. Francis Barry McCarthy, Counterfeit Interpretations of State Constitutions in Criminal
Procedure, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 79, 109 (2007) (“Before the Weeks decision, only one state,
Iowa, had created an exclusionary rule for search and seizure violations.”).
125. Henry S. Cohn & Ethan Davis, Stopping the Wind that Blows and the River that Runs:
Connecticut and Rhode Island Reject the Prohibition Amendment, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 327,
327 (2009); Scott Allen Merriman, Gangster and Bootleggers, in JAZZ AGE: PEOPLE AND PER-
SPECTIVES 39 (Mitchell Newton Matza & Peter C. Mancall eds., 2009).
126. Early state prohibitory laws are somewhat familiar to constitutional scholars.  For exam-
ple, in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), the Supreme Court concluded that Kansas’ prohib-
itory law did not violate the due process rights of a beer brewer to his property.
127. ELIZABETH K. GOETSCH, WICKED NASHVILLE 85 (2017) (Tennessee’s statewide prohibi-
tory law was in effect from 1909 to 1938); MARK H. WAYMACK & JAMES F. HARRIS, THE BOOK
OF CLASSIC AMERICAN WHISKEYS 182 (1995) (observing that Jack Daniel’s Distillery moved to
St. Louis when prohibition began in Tennessee; Jack Daniel’s was far from the only distillery
affected by statewide prohibition.  By the turn of the twentieth century, Tennessee had licensed
700 distilleries); STEPHANIE STEWART-HOWARD, KENTUCKY BOURBON AND TENNESSEE WHIS-
KEY 132 (2016) (describing Dickel’s move to Louisville).
128. DIXIE HIBBS & DORIS SETTLES, PROHIBITION IN BARDSTOWN: BOURBON, BOOTLEGGERS
& SALOONS (2016) (providing a brief history of every licensed distillery in western Kentucky).
The Wine and Spirits Bulletin, a trade publication of the alcohol industry, published what it
called a “National Directory—Fine Blends and Trade Brands” that listed whiskeys produced in
the United States in the early 1900s.  The number of Kentucky-based distillers in the list is strik-
ing.  Thomas H. Appleton, Jr., Prohibition and Politics in Kentucky: The Gubernatorial Cam-
paigns and Election of 1915, 75 REG. KY. HIST. SOC. 28 (1977); Stanley D. Baum & Thomas H.
Appleton, Jr., Wet Dry Referenda in Kentucky and the Persistence of Prohibition Forces, 39
SOUTHEASTERN GEOGRAPHER 172 (Nov. 1999).  Congress bolstered state efforts at prohibitory
laws in 1913, enacted a law excluding from interstate commerce alcohol whose consumption is
illegal at its destination point under state law.  Lindsay Rogers, Unlawful Possession of Intoxicat-
ing Liquors and the Webb-Kenyon Act, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1916).
129. Youman v. Commonwealth, 224 S.W. 860 (Ky. 1920); People v. Marxhausen, 171 N.W.
557 (Mich. 1919); State v. Owens, 259 S.W. 100 (Mo. 1924); State v. Laundy, 204 P. 958 (Ore.
1922); Hughes v. State, 238 S.W. 588 (Tenn. 1922); State v. Gibbons, 203 P. 390 (Wash. 1922);
State v. Wills, 114 S.E. 261 (W. Va. 1922); Artz v. Andrews, 94 So. 329 (Fla. 1922); Gore v. State,
24 Okla. Crim. App. 394 (1923); Tucker v. State, 90 So. 845 (Miss. 1922); State v. Arregui, 254 P.
788 (Idaho 1927); People v. Castree, 143 N.E. 112 (Ill. 1924); Flum v. State, 141 N.E. 353 (Ind.
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tury efforts at liquor enforcement.130  With metropolitan police
departments well established,131 warrantless liquor searches were as
threatening as searches pursued by the Temperance Watchmen.  Ille-
gal searches of any sort therefore had to be deterred and Weeks pro-
vided a template for deterring such misconduct.
Few contemporary legal scholars attribute the change of heart by
state courts to abuses in liquor enforcement—or to opposition to Pro-
hibition itself—despite language in state court opinions that make
these conclusions all but inescapable.132  Zechariah Chafee contended
that the trend of jurisdictions adopting the rule in the early 1920s was
due to an interest in conforming federal and state criminal proce-
dure.133  One academic even contended that Prohibition had deterred
states from adopting the exclusionary rule in light of concerns that the
rule would impair efforts to enforce the liquor laws.134  In the years
following Prohibition, almost no one has discussed the role of Prohibi-
tion in the decision of states to adopt the exclusionary rule.135
Prohibition, however, not the Supreme Court’s persuasive influ-
ence, seems to have been the catalyst for the exclusionary rule’s ac-
ceptance in the states.  Some state courts during this period were
unwilling to acknowledge they were adopting a federally devised
mechanism to address abuses in liquor searches.  Excluding reliable
evidence of a crime to deter police misconduct was a radical departure
from the law that had historically prevailed, with a few minor excep-
1923); State v. Gooder, 234 N.W. 610 (S.D. 1930); State ex rel. King v. Dist. Ct., 224 P. 862
(Mont. 1924); Hoyer v. State, 193 N.W. 89 (Wis. 1923); State v. George, 231 P. 683 (Wyo. 1924);
Robert O. Dawson, State-Created Exclusionary Rules in Search and Seizure: A Study of the Texas
Experience, 59 TEX. L. REV. 191, 196–98 (1981).
130. State v. Rowley, 195 N.W. 881 (Iowa 1923).
131. ERIC MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 1860–1920 (2004).
132. Asher Cornelius’ search and seizure treatise may be the only substantial legal text of the
time to expressly acknowledge the causal connection between Prohibition and the legal doc-
trines that were developing. See ASHER L. CORNELIUS, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
BEING A PRESENTATION IN THE FORM OF BRIEFS WHICH COVER ALL OF THE PHASES OF THE
SUBJECT TOGETHER WITH PERTINENT FORMS 54 (1925).
133. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Progress of the Law, 1919–1922, 35 HARV. L. REV. 673, 696
(1922).  While a number of the state courts adopting the exclusionary rule during Prohibition
cited precedent from the United States Supreme Court, only the South Dakota Supreme Court
cited the merits of conformity between federal and state law as a virtue of adopting the rule.
Gooder, 234 N.W. at 613 (“While a contrary view to that herein announced still prevails in a
majority of the state courts, the rule we now adopt is that of the Supreme Court of the United
States and other federal courts and seems to be gaining adherents from the state courts.”).
134. Thomas E. Atkinson, Prohibition and the Doctrine of the Weeks Case, 23 MICH. L. REV.
748 (1925).
135. Francis Allen’s article is an exception, striking for the date of its publication, 1961.  Fran-
cis A. Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the American Law of Search and Seizure, 52 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE SCI. 246, 250 (1961) (observing that “most of the states that accepted
the ‘Weeks Rule’ did so during the period of national prohibition”).
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tions.136  One would therefore expect a court working such a change
in the law to include every possible source of support available.
In Town of Blackburg v. Beam, the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina considered a case in which a farmer concealed liquor in a trunk on
a train.137  An officer, “without any process” searched the defendant’s
person, obtained a key to the trunk, and found whisky contained
therein.138  The Court cited no authority, federal or otherwise, in con-
cluding that this unlawfully obtained evidence would not support a
conviction:
We have no doubt but that a conviction under the recited circum-
stances is unlawful.  Some things are to be more deplored than the
unlawful transportation of whisky; one is the loss of liberty.  Com-
mon as the event may be, it is a serious thing to arrest a citizen, and
it is a more serious thing to search his person; and he who accom-
plishes it, must do so in conformity to the laws of the land.  There
are two reasons for this; one to avoid bloodshed, and the other to
preserve the liberty of the citizen.  Obedience to law is the bond of
society, and the officers set to enforce the law are not exempt from
its mandates.
In the instant case the possession of the liquor was the body of the
offense; that fact was proven by a forcible and unlawful search of
the defendant’s person to secure the veritable key to the offense.  It
is fundamental that a citizen may not be arrested and have his per-
son searched by force and without process in order to secure testi-
mony against him.139
A year later, a defendant in South Carolina sought to have illegally-
seized evidence of gambling activity excluded from his criminal
trial.140  In support of his argument he cited Beam, seemingly binding
authority on a South Carolina court.141  He also cited the Weeks deci-
sion—not binding authority on a matter of criminal procedure in 1917,
but certainly a precedent one would not expect a state court to ig-
nore.142  The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected both Weeks and
Beam.  Of Weeks, the Court noted that “protection against officers
not acting under claim of federal authority is not afforded by the guar-
anty of immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.”143
136. Roots, supra note 7, at 43 (challenging the traditional conclusion that the Framers knew
nothing of an exclusionary rule).
137. Town of Blacksburg v. Beam, 88 S.E. 441 (S.C. 1916).
138. Id. at 441.
139. Id.
140. State v. Harley, 92 S.E. 1034 (S.C. 1917).
141. Id. at 1035.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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It was harder for the court to reject the Beam decision. The court
held, remarkably, that Beam could be better explained as a recogni-
tion of an individual’s right to possess alcohol for personal consump-
tion rather than a decision about the limits of an officer’s search and
seizure powers.144  South Carolina thus expressly limited its version of
the exclusionary rule to seizures—with or without a warrant—of
alcohol.
South Carolina was not the only state to use precedents other than
Boyd and Weeks to deter illegal liquor searches. Other states used
long-existing authority developed in state courts to exclude illegally
obtained evidence.  A number of states relied on doctrines dating
back to Dow’s 1851 prohibitory law in Maine to conclude that a com-
plaint about illegally possessed alcohol not supported by adequate
suspicion prevented a subsequent conviction even if alcohol was dis-
covered.  A New York court in 1921 recognized that an action to for-
feit alcohol could not proceed if officers were not permitted by the
warrant to enter the property they searched.145  The mechanism that
responded to the Maine Law remained a limitation on liquor prosecu-
tions in states like Alabama that never adopted the exclusionary
rule.146  Indiana likewise concluded in 1921 that a search warrant ap-
plication filed without an affidavit supporting probable cause pre-
vented a forfeiture action for the alcohol from going forward.147
These decisions all reflected the same idea as mid-nineteenth cen-
tury liquor laws—the search warrant was viewed as the complaint and
an action could not follow from an invalid complaint.148  A New York
trial court in 1920 used this idea to invalidate a criminal prosecution
unrelated to liquor.  In People v. Kinney, an indictment for the illegal
possession of a weapon was quashed because the gun was discovered
in a search based on an invalid warrant.149
144. Id.
145. In re Search Warrant to Search & Seize Intoxicating Liquors at 52 Front St., 190 N.Y.S.
574 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1921); Cheek v. State, 57 So. 108 (Ala. App. Ct. 1911).
146. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224–25 (1960) (containing an appendix identi-
fying which states had the exclusionary rule and which states did not).
147. Thompson v. State, 130 N.E. 412 (Ind. 1921).
148. It is hardly surprising that search and seizure cases in state court in liquor cases only
addressed the most common challenge to a search—an invalid warrant.  Thomas Davies has
observed that the United States Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States only addressed a small
portion of what would come to be the scope of the exclusionary rule. Weeks, he correctly noted,
only considered the requirement of a valid warrant for a search.  The decision covered no more
than necessary, not even mentioning arrests.  Davies, Can You Handle the Truth?, supra note 84,
at 120.
149. 185 N.Y.S. 645 (S. Ct. Erie Cty. 1920).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-3\DPL305.txt unknown Seq: 28 30-MAR-18 10:11
500 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:473
While modern commentators generally did not regard the expan-
sion of the exclusionary rule in the states to be an effort to control
improper police searches, one very prominent professor acknowl-
edged a correlation between Prohibition and expansion of the rule.
John Henry Wigmore, author of the most influential evidence treatise
in American history, was perhaps the most ardent opponent of the
exclusionary rule—and certainly the most acerbic.150  He saw the rule
as grounded in an illogical sympathy for the victims of illegal searches,
not an effort to deter police misconduct.  The first edition of his trea-
tise was published in 1905 and described the exclusion of evidence
because of the manner in which it was seized to be an exercise of
“misguided sentimentality.”151
In subsequent editions, as federal courts became committed to the
rule and state courts began to embrace the rule, the eminent treatise
writer called the rule un-American.  Wigmore concluded that such
emotional appeals had been too readily accepted in post-World War I
courts.  For Wigmore, “the stern repressive war measures against trea-
son, disloyalty and anarchy in the years 1917–1919” prompted a “re-
crudescence of individualistic sentimentality for freedom of speech
and conscience” which criminal defendants exploited to prevent the
admission of incriminating evidence.152  “It was natural,” Wigmore
wrote, “for the misguided pacifist or semi-pro-German interests to in-
voke the protection of the Fourth Amendment.”153
While documents had been seized to prosecute sedition cases dur-
ing World War I, Fourth Amendment concerns did not play a major
role.154  Wigmore’s anti-German comments appear to have had an
anti-alcohol tone.  Prohibition had been a success, in part, because
many American brewers and distillers were of German origin.  Com-
panies that now seem synonymous with America—Budweiser,
150. ANDREW PORWANCHER, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE: THE
HIDDEN ORIGINS OF MODERN LAW 2 (2016) (claiming Wigmore “helped catalyze a new era in
American law” and describing him as a “prophet of modernity”); Jill Lepore, On Evidence:
Proving Frye as a Matter of Law, Science, and History, 124 YALE L. J. 1092, 1106 n.85 (2015)
(quarreling with another academic’s contention that an acerbic example of Wigmore’s writing
was uncharacteristic).
151. WIGMORE, supra note 22, at § 2184.
152. Id. (2d ed. 1923).
153. Id.
154. See GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM THE SEDI-
TION ACT TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 135–234 (2004) (discussing prosecutions for expressions
of ideas during World War I).
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Anheuser-Busch, Pabst, Schlitz, Stroh’s, and George A. Dickel—were
founded by German immigrants.155
A number of interest groups, whose motives ranged from benevo-
lence to intolerance combined to make Prohibition a reality.  From
Carrie Nation’s Anti-Saloon League to the Ku Klux Klan, a wide-
ranging coalition supported Prohibition.156  Post World War I, support
for Prohibition was partially derived from a resentment of German-
owned companies profiting from American vice.157  For a curmudgeon
like Wigmore, who painted with a broad brush, the exclusionary rule
was offensive because it protected Germans of all sorts—from spies to
brewers.  He believed that as Prohibition caused more searches it also
created more opportunities for illogical, unpatriotic acts by courts that
undermined their legitimacy:
Since the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment and its auxiliary
legislation, a new and popular occasion has been afforded for the
misplaced invocation of this principle; and the judicial excesses of
many Courts in sanctioning its use give an impression of maudlin
complaisance which would be ludicrous if it were not so dangerous
to the general respect for law and order in the community.158
Undeniably, more searches occurred because of the new liquor
laws.  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals observed in 1922 that the
“question of search and seizure is now being raised in nearly all liquor
cases tried in this State, if the facts at all justify the defense in inter-
posing objections relating to such question.”159  But unlike Wigmore,
society was outraged by the searches, not the suppression of evi-
dence.160  An Assistant United States Attorney handling liquor cases
in New York City observed in 1923:
For a time after the Volstead Act went into effect . . . few persons,
even among lawyers, conceived the idea of questioning any Federal
Government agent’s right to search for and seize contraband liquor
as he felt inclined or as his suspicions directed.  The agents them-
155. MARGARET LITTMAN, MOON TENNESSEE (2016) (noting Dickel’s ethnic heritage); JAMES
A. HART & DIETER SCHULTZE-ZEU, U.S. BUSINESS AND TODAY’S GERMANY: A GUIDE FOR
CORPORATE EXECUTIVES AND ATTORNEYS 215–17 (1995) (describing history of Budweiser com-
pany); THOMAS ADAMS, GERMANY AND THE AMERICAS: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND HISTORY 132
(2005) (describing founding of major breweries by German immigrants).
156. DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 29, 86 (2010).
157. Margot Opdycke Lamme, Tapping into War: Leveraging World War I in the Drive for a
Dry Nation, 21 AM. JOURNALISM 63 (2013).
158. John Henry Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A.
J. 479, 481 (1922).
159. Welchek v. State, 247 S.W. 524, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922).
160. See, e.g., John Barker Waite, Evidence: Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence, 42 MICH.
L. REV. 679, 685–86 (1944) (describing destruction of bars once alcohol was found).
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selves, and many of their superiors, felt secure in their right to do so
as Government officials.161
The Wickersham Commission observed in 1931 that Prohibition had
gotten off to a “bad start” in part because:
High-handed methods, shootings and killings, even when justified,
alienated thoughtful citizens, believers in law and order.  Unfortu-
nate public expressions by advocates of the law, approving killings
and promiscuous shootings and lawless raids and seizures and dep-
recating the constitutional guarantees involved, aggravated this ef-
fort.  Pressure for lawless enforcement, encouragement of bad
methods and agencies of obtaining evidence, and crude methods of
investigation and seizures on the part of badly chosen agents started
a current of adverse opinion in many parts of the land.162
There was a proliferation of search and seizure law because there
was a proliferation of searches and seizures.  With an ever-expanding
number of states denying prosecutors the right to use unlawfully ob-
tained evidence, a vast body of law was created.  In 1926, Asher Cor-
nelius, completed the first American treatise dedicated entirely to
search and seizure law.  Cornelius concluded the topic deserved thor-
ough treatment because of National Prohibition.163  The new laws, he
observed, had resulted “in the creation of a multitude of officers
whose duties are almost wholly those of search and seizure.”164
During Prohibition, the greatest concern was the search for liquor;
however, social groups were affected differently.  For less affluent
targets, violence during liquor raids was not uncommon and jail was
the only alternative if they were unable to pay fines.  Conversely, for
socialites, Prohibition may have added a degree of glamour.  New
York City Mayor Jimmie Walker had his own booth in a cellar-level
speakeasy in the upscale Club 21 that could be concealed by a door
that resembled a solid wall.165  Upper-class victims of liquor searches
were rarely shot in raids or forced to serve lengthy jail sentences, but
illegal searches and seizures befell all social groups.166  The African
American publication Richmond Planet observed, “A man’s home
161. Victor House, Search and Seizure Limits Under the Prohibition Act, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
1923, at X14.
162. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON ENFORCEMENT
OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, Part III, 2 (Jan. 7, 1931).
163. ASHER CORNELIUS, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE: BEING A PRESENTATION IN THE
FORM OF BRIEFS WHICH COVER ALL THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE SUBJECT, TOGETHER WITH
PERTINENT FORMS iii (1926).
164. Id. at 2.
165. GEORGE WALSH, GENTLEMAN JIMMY WALKER: MAYOR OF THE JAZZ AGE (1974); HER-
BERT MITGANG, ONCE UPON A TIME IN NEW YORK: JIMMY WALKER AND FRANKLIN
ROOSEVELT AND THE LAST GREAT BATTLE OF THE JAZZ AGE (2000).
166. MCGIRR, supra note 10, at 88, 119.
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used to be his castle.  Now it is the United States government’s castle
and the rights and privileges have been taken away.”167  Police brutal-
ity has long been inflicted more heavily on racial minorities, and this
certainly did not abate during Prohibition.168  In fact, the Ku Klux
Klan was deputized to assist in Prohibition enforcement in some com-
munities.169  Nevertheless, rich and poor, black and white, found com-
mon ground in their concern about liquor searches.
Neither state nor federal Prohibition agents were well-trained and
there was a feedback loop to this culture of incompetence.  Federal
agents were already constrained by the exclusionary rule, but the poor
track record of federal agents, and certainly state agents, in the early
days of Prohibition created pressure for greater regulation of state
agents enforcing Prohibition.  As the Wickersham Report observed in
1931, “in some states concurrent state enforcement made an especially
bad start with respect to searches and seizures.”170  Early federal of-
ficers were “largely unfit by training, experience, or character to deal
with so delicate a subject.”171  As the “distinction between federal and
state enforcement officers was not easily made,” there was pressure
on state courts to control the excesses of the first years of Prohibition
enforcement.172
Accounts of illegal seizures often appeared in the decisions of state
courts that increasingly recognized that excluding illegally obtained
evidence was essential to deter illegal liquor searches.  Even though
the Kansas Supreme Court concluded in 1924 that a still seized in a
warrantless search of a home could be admitted in a criminal trial, a
spirited dissent noted the country’s recent change of heart on the ex-
clusionary rule.173  In his dissent, Justice Harvey observed that
searches for evidence were uncommon in the country’s first hundred
years, but had become more common with statutes creating victimless
crimes.174  Harvey concluded that the long-standing view that reliable
evidence was always admissible had been challenged as police
searches became more common.
167. Id. at 91.
168. SHANNON KING, WHOSE HARLEM IS IT ANYWAY?: COMMUNITY POLITICS AND GRASS-
ROOTS ACTIVISM DURING THE NEW NEGRO ERA 11 (2015) (discussing how issues of police bru-
tality were covered in different newspapers in the 1920s).
169. MCGIRR, supra note 10, at 122, 134–35, 139, 141.
170. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON ENFORCEMENT
OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, Part III:2, p. 82 (Jan. 7, 1931).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. State v. Johnson, 226 P. 245 (Kan. 1924).
174. Id. at 250 (Harvey, J., dissenting).
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The early authorities in this country without much discussion of the
matter, and some later state decisions, hold that the rule of evidence
should be followed, and that one who was deprived of his constitu-
tional rights must seek redress by an action against the officer for
damages.  It is now generally recognized that the only effective way
of securing the constitutional rights of the party in such a case is to
prohibit the use of such evidence by prosecuting officers.175
In reversing a liquor conviction, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals strongly hinted at the state’s minimal interest in prosecuting
Prohibition offenders.  The defendant in Gore v. State had been con-
victed of operating a still, a misdemeanor offense.176  The court recog-
nized it was reversing long-standing assumptions when it adopted the
exclusionary rule, but observed that new types of searches had led to
previously unforeseen opportunities for government oppression.177
Almost mocking the liquor laws themselves, the court identified other
crimes which posed no harm to others.
The insidious encroachments upon the liberty and private affairs of
the individual by boards, commissions, examiners, detectives, in-
spectors, and other agents of the state and municipalities now pre-
vail to such an extent that self-respecting citizens, in urban
communities especially, do not know in the course of a day how
many rules or regulations they have violated, for which they may be
subject to a penalty.  If one inadvertently expectorates in the street,
or parks his car at a wrong angle, or places his garbage in the wrong
kind of receptacle he may be guilty of an offense.  If these govern-
ment agencies, contrary to the letter and the spirit of our Constitu-
tion, are encouraged or condoned by the courts in their invasion of
the privacy of homes, offices and places of business, forcibly and
without invitation, for the purpose of procuring evidence to convict
one of some misdemeanor, the practice followed to its logical con-
clusion will make our vaunted freedom a mere pretense, valueless,
and without substance.  Whenever the courts actively encourage of-
ficers to procure evidence illegally by force, the officers soon be-
come dictatorial, arrogant, and even brutal—a natural consequence
of the court’s approval of obtaining evidence illegally by force.178
Even though Gore addressed several other crimes, its decision to
adopt the exclusionary rule seems driven by its concern about Prohibi-
tion enforcement.  It is hard to imagine how evidence proving any of
the other identified offenses would involve an intrusive search.  In
Gore, the crimes offered as analogous to Prohibition were quite triv-
ial, implying the court thought Prohibition was as well.  Illegal
175. Id.
176. Gore v. State, 218 P. 545 (Okla. Crim. App. 1923).
177. Id. at 548.
178. Id. at 549–50.
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searches, the court appears to have been noting, were occurring to
enforce a law no more serious than a parking violation.
The Florida Supreme Court in Atz regarded the exclusionary rule as
necessary to avoid hypocrisy.  The court observed that if society was
going to expect its citizens to be so morally pure to avoid alcohol, it
could not use unlawfully obtained evidence to prove the infraction.
For one to acquire illegally, or illegally to possess intoxicating li-
quors is a crime; but it is a crime that generally affects a few persons
in a restricted locality.  To permit an officer of the State to acquire
evidence illegally and in violation of sacred constitutional guarantees,
and to use the illegally acquired evidence in the prosecution of the
person who illegally acquired the intoxicants, strikes at the very
foundation of the administration of justice, and where such prac-
tices prevail make law enforcement a mockery.179
Similar to Gore, this seems to be a judgment about the relative seri-
ousness of liquor offenses.  The calculation expressly balances the se-
riousness of the offense against the gravity of the search and seizure
violation.  The prosecutors in Atz made no attempt to explain the un-
lawful seizure of evidence as an anomaly.  Instead they argued courts
should not concern themselves with excesses of Prohibition enforce-
ment.  While it should be expected that officers of the law “know the
law of the realm, and mean duly to observe it . . . we cannot hope, in
the present state of society, to be certain of the protection of officers
possessing the qualifications above mentioned.”180  The Florida Su-
preme Court adopted the exclusionary rule in light of the attorney
general’s concession that widespread unlawful searches to enforce the
low-level crime would continue.181
The Supreme Court’s first automobile search case came out of
Michigan during Prohibition. Carroll v. United States held that a war-
rant is not required to search an automobile if the searching officer
has probable cause.182  The facts of the case illustrate the liberties of-
ficers were routinely taking with the privacy of citizens.  Prohibition
agents set up a liquor purchase with three men in a Grand Rapids
apartment on the evening of September 29, 1921.183  The men, likely
suspecting that this was a sting operation, told the agents they would
deliver the liquor that evening, departed in an Oldsmobile Roadster,
179. Atz v. Andrews, 94 So. 329, 332 (Fla. 1922).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 332.
182. 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1980 Term—Search Incident to Arrest
and the Automobile Exception, 95 HARV. L. REV. 251, 261 (1981) (identifying Carroll as the
origin of the automobile exception).
183. Id. at 134.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-3\DPL305.txt unknown Seq: 34 30-MAR-18 10:11
506 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:473
and never returned.184  Months later, the same agents saw this car
traveling on a highway from Detroit to Grand Rapids.185  They pulled
the car over, slashed the upholstery in the seats, and discovered sixty-
eight bottles of whiskey and gin.186  The Court assumed there was
probable cause for the search and did not consider what the appropri-
ate scope of liquor searches should be.  The extent of the intrusion
that occurred, based on weak proof of a relatively petty crime, is a
story common to police-citizen interactions.
Carroll was far from the only—or most egregious—example of po-
lice abuses in the searches for liquor in Michigan.  Michigan adopted
prohibitory laws in 1918, before the Volstead Act went into effect in
1920 and made alcohol possession a federal crime.187  Foreshadowing
events to come, ill-trained and ill-equipped zealous officers almost im-
mediately began to make the public uncomfortable with their tactics.
In 1919, troopers in an unmarked car suspected a car traveling be-
tween Ann Arbor and Detroit of bootlegging and ordered it to stop.
Unsure of whether he was being stopped by police or robbed by
criminals, the driver of the car did not comply.  The officers therefore
opened fire on the non-compliant automobile, hitting one of the pas-
sengers in the neck.  No alcohol was discovered in the subsequent
search.188
Between 1918 and 1920, because Michigan had forbidden the sale of
alcohol, importation of alcohol into Michigan was largely concerned
with circumventing the state’s laws.189  However, once liquor sales
were prohibited in every state, Michigan became a gateway for much
of the nation’s alcohol from the British Empire.  Historian Larry En-
glemann observed that in Michigan “prohibition enforcement was too
often careless and even gratuitous, and many times its victims were
not rumrunners but innocent bystanders. . . . Bullets of the police,
many citizens concluded, were wreaking more havoc on an innocent
public than the bottled beverages of the brewers ever did.”190
184. Id. at 134–35.
185. Id. at 135.
186. Id. at 136.
187. STEPHEN C. JOHNSON, DETROIT BEER: A HISTORY OF BREWING IN THE MOTOR CITY
(2016).
188. ENGELMANN, supra note 11.
189. See RUSSELL M. MAGNAGHI, UPPER PENINSULA OF MICHIGAN: A HISTORY 162 (2017)
(noting that as statewide Prohibition started two years before National Prohibition, Michi-
ganders “had two years to develop means of importing or making their own alcohol supply”).
190. ENGELMANN, supra note 11, at 97.
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Michigan, not surprisingly, was the only state to have the exclusion-
ary rule when National Prohibition went into effect.191 People v.
Marxhausen was decided by the Michigan Supreme Court on Febru-
ary 18, 1919, roughly eight months before Congress passed the Vol-
stead Act over President Wilson’s veto prohibiting the sale,
distribution, or transportation of beverages containing more than
0.5% alcohol.192  The Volstead Act must have been foreseeable to the
Michigan Supreme Court.  After a lengthy national campaign for Pro-
hibition, the Eighteenth Amendment was certified one month before
Marxhausen and authorized Congress to enact laws forbidding com-
merce that involved alcohol.193  Even before federal enforcement ef-
forts added tension to the situation, Michigan experienced
considerable issues in the mistreatment of its citizens in efforts to en-
force the state liquor laws.  Asher Cornelius described the historical
context that prompted the state’s supreme court to adopt the rule:
A large part of the entire force of the Michigan State Police, num-
bering more than two hundred and fifty men, were employed from
May 1, 1918, to Feb. 18, 1919, in patrolling truck highways of the
state, day and night, stopped every automobile to search for intoxi-
cating liquors.  Sometimes the search was thorough; sometimes
merely casual, by looking into the car; but none escaped.  It can
hardly be doubted that the Supreme Court of Michigan was cogni-
zant of this condition of affairs at the time the Marxhausen case was
rendered . . . and that such conditions were of influence in that
decision.194
Prohibition encouraged a variety of troubling conduct that courts
were doubtlessly trying to discourage.  Not only those on the public
payroll at the state or federal level were interested in zealously enforc-
ing Prohibition in the 1920s.  As in the 1850s, private groups particu-
larly interested in the subject were permitted to join the effort.  In the
nineteenth century, Temperance Watchmen conducted liquor searches
with the authorization of courts.  In the early twentieth century, local
law enforcement frequently allowed a far more sinister organization
191. Iowa adopted the exclusionary rule in 1903, State v. Sheridan, 96 N.W. 730 (Iowa 1903),
but rejected it in 1923, State v. Rowley, 195 N.W. 881 (Iowa 1923).  South Carolina appeared to
adopt the rule in 1916, Town of Blackburg v. Beam, 88 S.E. 441 (S.C. 1916), but in a year either
limited the rule to alcohol cases or overruled it entirely, State v. Harley, 92 S.E. 1034, 1035 (S.C.
1917).  There were other primitive versions of the exclusionary rule, most frequently involving
invalid mid-nineteenth century liquor searches.
192. 171 N.W. 557 (Mich. 1919).
193. DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 106 (2010).
194. ASHER L. CORNELIUS, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE: BEING A PRESENTATION IN
THE FORM OF BRIEFS WHICH COVER ALL OF THE PHASES OF THE SUBJECT TOGETHER WITH
PERTINENT FORMS 54 n.63 (1925).
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to assist in its efforts.195  In adopting the exclusionary rule, the Florida
Supreme Court contrasted the purity that prohibitionists were insist-
ing upon with the unlawful tactics they were willing to tolerate.  Inter-
estingly, the Florida court referenced the Klan in its opinion as an
example of the worst kind of abuses American society had known,
perhaps taking a veiled shot at the company prohibitionists were will-
ing to keep.
In this era, when earnest-thinking men and women are ardently try-
ing to arouse public sentiment on the subject of strict law enforce-
ment, it would seem most meet and proper for the courts to set the
example, and not sanction law-breaking and constitutional violation
in order to obtain testimony against another law-breaker.  Better
the mob and the Ku-Klux, than a conviction obtained in a temple of
justice by testimony illegally acquired by agents of the government
and officers of the law.  The distinction between illegally acquired
testimony and perjured testimony is not in kind, but in degree, and
a conviction obtained by the use of either or both of these methods
condemns the administration of justice at the same time that it con-
demns the prisoner.  The liberties of the people cannot safely be
intrusted [sic] to those who believe that violation of prohibition laws
is more heinous than violations of the Constitution.196
Anti-Prohibition sentiment doubtlessly drove some of the move-
ment toward the exclusionary rule.  Some courts, the highest courts in
Florida and Oklahoma among them, expressly compared the serious-
ness of liquor law violations to the unlawful searches that officers
were conducting to discover such violations.  Anti-Prohibition inter-
ests prompted Texas to be the only state in the nation to adopt the
exclusionary rule.197  Prohibition in Texas existed in no small part be-
cause its legislature was dominated by Klan-backed candidates.198  As
with all southern states at this time, virtually all elected officials were
Democrats199 and many wings of the party opposed Prohibition.
When the Klan lost control of the Texas Democratic Party in 1924, the
newly-elected legislature forbid the admission of unlawfully seized ev-
idence in Texas courts the following year.200
Other supporters of the exclusionary rule were, however, clearly in
favor of Prohibition.  Justice William Anderson of the Mississippi Su-
195. MCGIRR, supra note 10, at 132–42.
196. Atz, 94 So. at 322.
197. Dawson, supra note 129, at 195–98.
198. CHARLES C. ALEXANDER, THE KU KLUX KLAN IN THE SOUTHWEST 222 (1965).
199. MICHAEL PERMAN, PURSUIT OF UNITY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
SOUTH 6–7 (2009).
200. ALEXANDER, supra note 198, at 121; V. O. KEY JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND
NATION 264 (1949); Dawson, supra note 129 at 195–98 (describing adoption of exclusionary rule
by Texas Legislature).
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preme Court fit into this camp.  Prior to writing the opinion that gave
the Magnolia State the exclusionary rule,201 he dissented from an
opinion that concluded Jamaica Ginger, with its ninety percent alcohol
content, fit within the state’s medicinal exception of its prohibitory
law.202  In that case, Anderson argued that allowing such exceptions
would make enforcement too difficult.203  However, Justice Anderson
would later write the majority opinion that excluded reliable evidence
of a liquor law violation.204  He reasoned that this result was necessary
to ensure the law was enforced consistent with the prohibition on un-
reasonable searches and seizures that was common to the constitu-
tions of Mississippi and the United States.205
There was no particular pattern to which states adopted, or chose
not to adopt, the exclusionary rule during Prohibition.  West Virginia
adopted the rule, but not Virginia;206 Mississippi, but not Alabama;207
South Dakota, but not North Dakota; Illinois, but not New York.208
Michigan,209 Washington,210 and Kentucky211 adopted the rule.  While
the timing of state decisions adopting the rule and the language of
these decisions strongly point to Prohibition as the catalyst for the
exclusionary rule, a map of the states themselves would not lead a
casual observer to conclude that Prohibition explains the rule’s emer-
gence.  States that appeared equally affected by Prohibition went both
ways.  The decision of the New York Court of Appeals to poetically
reject the rule in 1926 illustrates the role Prohibition played.
New York’s highest court in 1903, like every state but Iowa, refused
to follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s lead and adopt the exclusionary
rule prior to Prohibition.212  In the early 1920s, however, trial and in-
201. Tucker v. State, 90 So. 845 (Miss. 1922).
202. Young v. State, 102 So. 161 (Miss. 1924) (Anderson, J., dissenting).
203. Id.
204. Tucker, 90 So. at 845.
205. Id.
206. State v. Wills, 114 S.E. 261, 268 (W. Va. 1922); Hall v. Commonwealth, 121 S.E. 154, 155
(Va. 1924).
207. State v. Gooder, 234 N.W. 610, 613 (S.D. 1930); State v. Fahn, 205 N.W. 67, 70–71 (N.D.
1925).
208. People v. Castree, 143 N.E. 112, 117 (Ill. 1924); People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 588 (N.Y.
1926).
209. People v. Marxhausen, 171 N.W. 557 (Mich. 1919).
210. State v. Gibbons, 203 P. 390 (Wash. 1922).
211. Youman v. Commonwealth, 224 S.W. 860, 867 (Ky. 1920).
212. People v. Adams, 68 N.E. 636, 640 (N.Y. 1903) (“[T]he court, when engaged in trying a
criminal cause, will not take notice of the manner in which witnesses have possessed themselves
of papers, or other articles of personal property which are material and properly offered into
evidence.”).  Michigan adopted the rule prior to National Prohibition, but after the adoption of a
statewide prohibitory law less than a year before the Volstead Act went into effect.  People v.
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termediate appellate courts in the Empire State acted contrary to
clear, controlling, and recent precedent and excluded the fruits of ille-
gal searches.213  Then, famously, in 1926, the New York Court of Ap-
peals in People v. Defore214 restated the position it previously took
and rejected the exclusionary rule.  The consequences of the exclu-
sionary rule are stark, then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo poetically wrote
for the majority, “[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered.”215
The timing of Cardozo’s opinion has been unappreciated (or com-
pletely unnoticed) by those who have considered the Defore decision.
Prohibition had been quite controversial from the start in New
York.216  The gubernatorial election of 1922 had been a referendum
on Prohibition.  Al Smith, the anti-Prohibition candidate, won the
election and in 1923 New York’s prohibitory law was repealed.217  Af-
ter 1923, New York was only affected by federal prohibitory laws.
Unlike courts in virtually every state that had adopted the exclusion-
ary rule, New York courts after 1923 did not have occasion to admit
the fruits of searches for liquor.218  The repeal of the state’s prohibi-
tory law meant that state and local police would engage in liquor
searches only to the extent they were assisting in federal prosecu-
tions.219  Therefore, a rule excluding unlawfully obtained evidence in
Marxhausen, 171 N.W. 557 (Mich. 1919).  Michigan’s adoption of the rule is therefore best re-
garded as occurring during National Prohibition.
213. See, e.g., People v. Kinney, 185 N.Y.S. 645 (Crim. Ct. 1920) (ordering return of defen-
dant’s revolver discovered in a search of his home for opium on the basis of an invalid warrant);
State v. One Hudson Cabriolet Auto., 116 Misc. 399, 404 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1921) (returning alcohol
seized and dismissing action for unlawful alcohol possession); People v. 738 Bottles of Intoxicat-
ing Liquors, 116 Misc. 252, 256–57 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1921) (holding that dismissal and return of
alcohol is the appropriate remedy for unlawfully seized alcohol); People v. Jakira, 193 N.Y.S.
306, 314 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1922); In re Search Warrant to Search & Seize Intoxicating Liquors at
52 Front St., 190 N.Y.S. 574, 576 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1921).
214. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
215. Id.
216. MICHAEL LERNER, DRY MANHATTAN 41 (2007).
217. See ROBERT A. SLAYTON, EMPIRE STATESMAN: THE RISE AND REDEMPTION OF AL
SMITH 125–39 (2001); Comment, Enforcement of the 18th Amendment in the Absence of State
Legislation, 36 YALE L.J. 260 (1926) (observing New York’s repeal of the Mullan-Gage Act);
Post, supra note 73, at 32–33 (discussing Al Smith’s view that the states were not required to
assist the federal prohibitory effort); EDWARD BEHR, PROHIBITION: THIRTEEN YEARS THAT
CHANGED AMERICA 167 (New York, Arcade Publishing 1996).
218. Maryland never adopted a state analog to the federal prohibitory law.  Eugene A. Gil-
more, Liberalizing the Volstead Act, 18 IOWA L. REV. 22, 29 n.19 (1932–1933).
219. People v. Conti, 216 N.Y.S. 442, 448–49 (Sup. Ct. 1926); People v. Wade, 217 N.Y.S. 486,
487 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1926). See Orin Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 504–05 (2011–2012); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28,
30–33 (1927); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 515–16 (1927).
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New York courts would do nothing to encourage police to comply
with constitutional limits while conducting searches for liquor.
By the end of Prohibition, eighteen states had adopted the exclu-
sionary rule.220  Between Prohibition’s repeal in 1933 and the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio in 1961, nine more states
adopted some version of the rule, but this number is deceptive.
Alaska and Hawaii were admitted into the Union during this period
and prior to their admission territorial courts were compelled to fol-
low the federal rule; thus, the newly admitted states’ courts were
merely following existing precedent.221  Three of those states, Ala-
bama, Maryland, and New Jersey, adopted the rule in statutes that
limited application to specific types of cases.  Alabama and New
Jersey limited application of the rule to liquor cases,222 while Mary-
land limited the rule to misdemeanor cases.223  Only four jurisdictions
adopted a version that applied to all types of crimes after Prohibition:
California,224 Delaware,225 North Carolina,226 and Rhode Island.227
Notably, the California Supreme Court was responding to a unique
problem of search and seizure abuses in Los Angeles that rivaled the
lawlessness of Prohibition enforcement.
Taking a nose-count of states with the exclusionary rule in the after-
math of Prohibition does not necessarily provide a meaningful assess-
ment of the country’s view of the rule or its wisdom in a world without
prohibitory laws.  The minimal inference from the four new states to
adopt the rule in this period is undermined by considering aspects of
the rules in three of these states.  The Supreme Court of Oregon ques-
tioned whether its Prohibition-era precedent establishing the rule was
dicta.228  Michigan amended its constitution to allow the admission of
firearms and bombs regardless of the means by which they were dis-
covered.229  The South Dakota Legislature provided that any evidence
seized by an officer acting with a warrant would be admissible regard-
220. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. .
221. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren
Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1379 n.102 (2004).
222. Oldham v. State, 67 So. 55, 55 (Ala. 1953); ALA. CODE tit. 29, §210 (Supp. 1955); N.J.
STAT. ANN. 33:1-62 (1930).
223. Hitzelberger v. State, 197 A. 605, 611 (Md. 1938) (describing statute).
224. People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 911, 915 (Cal. 1955).
225. Rickards v. State, 77 A.2d 199, 205 (Del. 1950).
226. State v. Mills, 98 S.E. 329, 335 (N.C. 1957).  Interestingly, Mills involved a liquor prosecu-
tion. Id.
227. State v. Hillman, 125 A.2d 94, 96 (R.I. 1956).
228. State v. Hoover, 347 P.2d 69, 73 (Ore. 1959).
229. People v. Gonzales, 97 N.W.2d 16, 22 (Mich. 1959).
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less of whether the warrant was lawfully issued.230  With the lack of
evidence of an emerging consensus, Mapp v. Ohio required every
state court in the United States, in a post-Prohibition world, to ex-
clude illegally obtained but reliable evidence.
IV. MAPP’S MISSED OPPORTUNITY
The Supreme Court decided Mapp v. Ohio at a time when police
dogs and water cannons were being unleashed on civil rights march-
ers, and police brutality and wrongful shooting claims were about to
take America to a breaking point in urban ghettos.231  As the Court
acknowledged within a few years of Mapp, the decision did nothing to
address improper police tactics unrelated to the search for physical
evidence.232  Yet illegal searches and seizures were not a major con-
cern in American society at the time—police misconduct was, but not
misconduct in the search for evidence.233  The exclusionary rule
gained acceptance in many state courts at a time when illegal searches
were a serious societal concern.  The rule, however, was imposed on
the remaining state courts when other issues were far more pressing.
Both the historical context and the Mapp decision itself reveal that the
remedy adopted was misplaced.  As the Supreme Court continues to
limit the scope of the exclusionary rule, the future of the rule is very
much in doubt.234  Fidelity to the actual societal concerns at the time
of Mapp requires addressing long-existing concerns about police
force.  This is true regardless of whether the exclusionary rule is the
appropriate mechanism for addressing those concerns.
Official abuses in the search for liquor were part of the national
discussion in the early 1920s and cases involving questionable uses of
force began attracting attention in the 1950s.  A police shooting of an
unarmed and uniformed African American veteran in New York City
230. State v. Lane, 82 N.W.2d 286, 289 (S.D. 1957).
231. CHRISTOPHER B. STRAIN, THE LONG SIXTIES: AMERICA, 1955–1973, at 149–54 (2016).
232. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1967); see also Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five:
A Revisionist History, 74 MISS. L. J. 423, 457–58 (2004) (expressing surprise that even though the
Warren Court was sympathetic to concerns about police, its decision in Terry “revealed a Court
that was sympathetic to maintaining order over the black population”).
233. Cahan, 282 P.2d at 913 (“[P]ublic opinion is not aroused as it is in the case of other
violations of constitutional rights.  Illegal searches and seizures lack the obvious brutality of
coerced confessions and the third degree and do not so clearly strike at the very basis of our civil
liberties as do unfair trials or the lynching of even an admitted murderer.”). Cahan’s description
of the public’s tolerance for search and seizure violations certainly would not have been true
from 1920 to 1933.
234. MACLIN, supra note 1, at 349 (2013) (“[T]he current Court appears positioned to repeal
the exclusionary rule altogether.”).
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provoked outrage and national coverage.235  The just-discharged sol-
dier was shot by two white officers in December 1950.236  Every
elected official in Harlem attended a rally denouncing the shooting
and images of the slain soldier were distributed to the national me-
dia.237  An all-white New York City grand jury heard the testimony of
forty-five witnesses, yet no charges were ever brought against the of-
ficers.238  One year later, another Harlem resident, crippled by polio,
was beaten unconscious and kicked in the face by officers in front of
his home.239  The victim’s uncle, a New York trial judge, issued a pub-
lic statement expressing his outrage and observing that in thirty years
no New York City officer had been prosecuted for excessive force or
unjustified homicide.240
Images of police brutality, often abusive treatment of civil rights
marchers, were displayed on every American television on a regular
basis.241  Such abuses by police were not limited to protestors who put
themselves in harm’s way.  In 1951, the Civil Rights Congress told the
United Nations, “Now there is not a great American city . . . that is
not disgraced by the wanton killing of innocent Negroes.  It is no
longer a sectional phenomena.”242
The year of the Mapp decision, 1961, was a particularly bad year for
police community relations in New Orleans.243  Riots in 1960
prompted by the desegregation of schools put the police department
on edge.  One man was shot and killed when he was stopped for a
broken taillight and reached to get his identification.244  An unarmed
eleven-year-old boy was shot five times and killed as he ran from the
scene of a burglary.245  Two weeks later, a burglary suspect was killed
in his cell as police attempted to subdue him.246  As in other cities,
protests followed these police killings.247  Black communities recog-
nized that police were consciously treating Black citizens differently
235. MARTHA BIONDI, TO STAND AND FIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN POST-
WAR NEW YORK 191–93 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003).
236. Id. at 192.
237. Id. at 193.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 193–94.
241. See LEONARD N. MOORE, BLACK RAGE IN NEW ORLEANS: POLICE BRUTALITY AND
AFRICAN AMERICAN ACTIVISM FROM WORLD WAR II TO HURRICANE KATRINA 43 (2010).
242. BIONDI, supra note 235 at 191.
243. MOORE, supra note 241, at 49–51.
244. Id. at 49.
245. Id. at 49.
246. Id. at 50.
247. Id. at 49–51.
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than white citizens.  Describing his policy of directing police enforce-
ment in Black neighborhoods, Los Angeles Police Chief William
Parker said in 1957, “I don’t think you can throw genes out of the
question when you discuss the behavior of people.”248
Against this backdrop of extraordinary racial tension and police
brutality, the Supreme Court decided Mapp v. Ohio, perhaps the sin-
gle most important case in the area of investigatory criminal proce-
dure.249  The Court in Mapp adopted the exclusionary rule for one
type of police misconduct, unreasonable searches and seizures for reli-
able evidence, finding that other methods of deterring this sort of mis-
conduct had proven ineffective.250  Thus, the Court left these
ineffective mechanisms in place to address the most serious police
misconduct of the late 1950s—harassment, excessive force, and unjus-
tified shootings.
The facts of Mapp were far from typical.  On May 23, 1957, the
house of Don King, the future fight promoter, was bombed.251  At the
time, King was a bookmaker in Cleveland and one of his rivals had
attempted to take him out.  King gave the police a lead, identifying
racketeer Alex Shonder Burns as a likely suspect because King had
refused to pay him $200 a week in protection money.252  Another
racketeer, Virgil Ogletree, also involved in illegal gambling and organ-
ized crime, was believed to have information about the bombing of
King’s home.253  Police focused their attention on the residence of
Dollree Mapp, on the top floor of a two-family dwelling, where Ogle-
tree was believed to be hiding.254  They sought to question Ogletree
about the bombing and discover any evidence that he was involved
with a competing gambling enterprise.255
Police knocked on Ms. Mapp’s door.256  Before answering, she
called her attorney and then told the officers that they could not enter
248. JOSHUA BLOOM & WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., BLACK AGAINST EMPIRE: THE HISTORY OF
THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY 28 (2013).
249. The exclusionary rule, which Mapp v. Ohio imposed on all the states, has been described
as “giv[ing] force and effect” to the Fourth Amendment.  New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458
(1981) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, “Case by Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Proce-
dures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141 (1974)). It has also been described
as “the primary mechanism for enforcing the [F]ourth [A]mendment.”  Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 360 (1974).
250. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652–55 (1961).
251. PRISCILLA MACHADO ZOTTI, INJUSTICE FOR ALL: MAPP V. OHIO AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 2 (2005).
252. Id. at 2, 7–8.
253. Id. at 16–17.
254. Id. at 17.
255. Id.
256. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644 (1961).
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without a warrant.257  The officers kept watch over the residence for
three hours and then forcibly entered without a warrant.258  Ms. Mapp
demanded to see the warrant, at which point one of the officers held
up a piece of paper.259  Ms. Mapp grabbed the paper out of his hand
and shoved it down her shirt.260  A tussle followed as officers retrieved
the paper, handcuffed her, and proceeded to search her home.261  Her
attorney arrived on the scene after the police entered the home, but
was denied access.262  In the course of the thorough search, officers
discovered pornographic materials for which Ms. Mapp was prose-
cuted, but neither Virgil Ogletree, nor any evidence of illegal gam-
bling was discovered.263
Commentators have frequently assumed that Mapp was driven by
the Court’s concern about police misconduct at this particular point in
history.  Corinna Lain correctly observed that “[b]y 1961, the Ameri-
can public was more concerned with illegal law enforcement practices
than it had been in years past.”264  Historian Martha Biondi observed,
“The grassroots struggle for police reform stands as an important his-
torical backdrop to the landmark U.S. Supreme Court rulings of the
1960s that restrained police behavior and expanded the rights of an
accused person in state criminal proceedings.”265  A New York Times
reporter in 1962 described Mapp as consistent with “a national moral
sentiment” against police misconduct.266  “Americans are plainly less
willing to tolerate police misbehavior in any state,” he wrote.267  If
these commentators are correct, and intuition alone leads one to think
they are, then Mapp is puzzling.  In its frustration with police, the Su-
preme Court addressed a type of misconduct for which California
Chief Justice Roger Traynor concluded “public opinion is not
aroused.”268
Remarkably, this line was from Chief Justice Traynor’s opinion that
adopted the exclusionary rule in California—an opinion that the Su-






262. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644 (1961).
263. Id. at 645.
264. Lain, supra note 221, at 1382.
265. BIONDI, supra note 235, at 207.
266. Lain, supra note 221, at 1383.
267. Id. (quoting Anthony Lewis, Historic Change in the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
1962, § 6, at 7.).
268. People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 913 (Cal. 1955).
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“[s]ignificantly, among those now following the rule is California,” the
Supreme Court in Mapp embraced practically verbatim the reasoning
and empirical conclusions of Chief Justice Traynor.269  The Supreme
Court concluded that state courts, like federal courts, were required to
exclude unlawfully obtained evidence partially due to California’s ex-
perience that other methods of deterring illegal searches and seizures
had proven “worthless and futile.”270  The Court offered no authority
for this proposition.271  The only piece of evidence in the opinion that
could be used to support this claim is that by the time Mapp was de-
cided a majority of states had embraced the exclusionary rule.272  The
probative value of this evidence is diminished when it is realized that
the overwhelming majority of states to adopt the rule did so when
illegal searches were rampant and frequently complained of.  By the
1960s, searches were not society’s primary concern with the police.
In fact, illegal search and seizures do not seem to be the actual issue
the Court is concerned with in Mapp.  The Court’s description of the
facts does not reserve its harshest criticism for the warrantless entry
itself, but the lack of dignity officers afforded Ms. Mapp.  The gravest
concerns were directed at officers’ actions that would have been per-
mitted if a warrant had been obtained, actions that the decision did
nothing to address:
When Miss Mapp did not come to the door immediately, at least
one of the several doors to the house was forcibly opened and the
policemen gained admittance.  Meanwhile Miss Mapp’s attorney ar-
rived, but the officers, having secured their own entry, and continu-
ing in their defiance of the law, would permit him neither to see
Miss Mapp nor to enter the house.  It appears that Miss Mapp was
halfway down the stairs from the upper floor to the front door when
the officers, in this highhanded manner, broke into the hall.  She
demanded to see the search warrant.  A paper, claimed to be a war-
rant, was held up by one of the officers.  She grabbed the “warrant”
and placed it in her bosom. A struggle ensued in which the officers
recovered the piece of paper and as a result of which they hand-
cuffed appellant because she had been “belligerent” in resisting
their official rescue of the “warrant” from her person. Running
roughshod over appellant, a policeman “grabbed” her, “twisted
[her] hand,” and she “yelled [and] pleaded with him” because “it was
hurting.”  Appellant, in handcuffs, was then forcibly taken upstairs
to her bedroom where the officers searched a dresser, a chest of
drawers, a closet and some suitcases.  They also looked into a photo
album and through personal papers belonging to the appellant.  The
269. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961).
270. Id. at 652.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 651.
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search spread to the rest of the second floor including the child’s
bedroom, the living room, the kitchen, and a dinette.  The basement
of the building and a trunk found therein were also searched.  The
obscene materials for possession of which she was ultimately con-
victed were discovered in the course of that widespread search.273
If the officers had a warrant to look for Ogletree and evidence of
his gambling activities, there would have been no objection to the of-
ficers’ struggling with Ms. Mapp, handcuffing her, or taking her with
them as they searched.  Even the thoroughness of the search would
have been justified as evidence of Ogletree’s gambling activities could
have been concealed in any part of the house.274  The officers’ han-
dling of Ms. Mapp, an African American woman, was the focus of the
Court’s factual description and a microcosm of national concerns.
Search and seizure issues—the only issues addressed in Mapp—were
a sideshow both in the Court’s description of the case and in the na-
tional conversation about police.
Dollree Mapp’s conviction, however, was reversed because officers
failed to obtain a warrant to search her home, not because of how
they went about searching it—or how they interacted with her during
the search.  If the Court’s concern had truly been the lack of judicial
approval of the officers’ entry and search of her home, the opinion
would have read very differently.  There certainly is no dearth of Su-
preme Court opinions that extol the virtues of warrants.  In Katz v.
United States, the Supreme Court considered whether the Fourth
Amendment precluded officers from placing a listening device on the
outside of a phone booth.275  The Court acknowledged in Katz that
the officers had “acted in an entirely defensible manner,” beginning
their eavesdropping only after they “had a strong probability that
[Katz] was using the telephone to transmit gambling information,”
and then limiting their surveillance “both in scope and duration . . . to
the specific purpose of establishing the content of [Katz’s] unlawful
telephonic communications.”276  These officers “acted with restraint”
in listening in only after they had an appropriate basis for doing so
and limited their surveillance.277  The Court nevertheless held that it
could not receive the evidence obtained in this method because “this
273. Id. at 644 (emphasis added).
274. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999) (holding that the object of the search
determines scope of the search).
275. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
276. Id. at 354.
277. Id. at 356.
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restrain was imposed by the agents themselves, not a judicial
officer.”278
Similarly, in Mincey v. Arizona the Court extolled the virtues of
warrants.279  Officers in Mincey responded to a murder scene and be-
gan to collect evidence inside the home where the murder occurred
without obtaining a warrant.280  Even though it was undisputed that a
magistrate would have issued a search warrant to process the crime
scene, the Court concluded that “it is a cardinal principle that searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.”281  There are exceptional circumstances that permit
searches without warrants, but the inevitability that such a warrant
would be granted is not a basis for the exception. Mincey’s facts per-
haps make it the Supreme Court’s greatest celebration of the virtues
of judicial oversight of an officer’s investigation.
The Court has even used poetic language in describing the virtues
of warrants.  In Johnson v. United States, an officer smelled the defen-
dant smoking opium in a Seattle hotel and knocked on the door, but
was denied entry when he introduced himself as a police officer.  The
officer therefore entered and searched the hotel room, finding evi-
dence of drug use.282  The Court observed that “[a]t the time entry
was demanded the officers were possessed of evidence which a magis-
trate might have found to be probable cause for issuing a search war-
rant.”283  Robert Jackson, writing the majority opinion, rejected the
argument that this fact was relevant to the disposition of the case.
Searches are not reasonable merely because a warrant could have
been issued, the Court held in one of its most memorable turns of a
phrase:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of
the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.  Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the of-
ficer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.284
By contrast, Mapp does not chastise the officers who invaded Dol-
lree Mapp’s house for their failure to stop by the magistrate’s cham-
278. Id.
279. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
280. Id. at 387–88.
281. Id. at 390.
282. 333 U.S. 10, 12 (1948).
283. Id. at 13.
284. Id. at 13–14.
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bers on the way to her house.  The Court’s description of the officers’
misdeeds addresses only the manhandling and restraint of Ms. Mapp,
not omission of a “neutral and detached magistrate” by officers “en-
gaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”  The
Court described a case that was about police brutality, or at a mini-
mum police harassment, in the course of a search and used those facts
to announce a rule preventing warrantless searches.
While the Court’s choice of doctrine in Mapp is difficult to explain
in light of the social context, Cahan, the California decision upon
which the Court relied so heavily, is rather easy to explain.  Los Ange-
les police officers in the 1950s—under the orders of Police Commis-
sioner William Parker—were engaging in the same sort of wholesale
disrespect for limits on search and seizure that prompted many state
courts to adopt the exclusionary rule.  Understanding the context of
Mapp v. Ohio depends on the political factors at play in California at
that time.  Fearing that Los Angeles was about to become the next
Las Vegas, with city officials tacitly accepting illegal gambling, Com-
missioner Parker engaged in a very aggressive campaign against gam-
bling.285  Wiretapping would have been an important tool in Parker’s
campaign against gambling, but both federal and California law had
prohibited it since Prohibition.286
California also forbade dictaphones, listening devices unattached to
phone lines colloquially known as bugs, but officers could install such
devices without the cooperation of a phone company.287  To obtain
the conversations the LAPD required to investigate gamblers, officers
unlawfully entered businesses and homes and installed dictaphones.288
The entry to place these bugs violated the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibitions on unreasonable searches and seizures and the bugs
themselves violated the spirit of state and federal prohibitions on
wiretapping.  California, however, had no exclusionary rule and illegal
entries by Chief Parker’s officers had not been deterred by the threat
of civil sanctions.289
Chief Parker’s zeal had drawn the ire of the United States Supreme
Court just one year prior to the Cahan decision.  In 1954, the Court in
Irvine v. California considered the consequences of an unlawful entry
285. JOHN BUNTIN, L.A. NOIR: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICA’S MOST SEDUC-
TIVE CITY 202–03 (2009).
286. Id. at 208.
287. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 47–49 (1967) (describing history of wiretapping, as
well as the laws of individual states on wiretapping and dictaphones).
288. BUNTIN, supra note 285, at 209.  Remarkably, dictaphones that did not connect with a
telephone line were not regarded as wiretapping. Id.
289. Id. at 203–09.
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into a home by LAPD officers to install a transmitting device.290  Of-
ficers took a locksmith to the home of a suspected gambler who made
a key to the front door.291  Two days later, officers used this key to
enter the home, install a bug, and drill a hole in the roof through
which wires were strung so that police in the neighbors’ garage could
overhear conversations that occurred in the house.292  Officers later
re-entered the home to move the location of the microphone.293
The United States Supreme Court condemned the warrantless entry
into the home with four justices observing that “few police measures
have come to our attention that more flagrantly, deliberately, or per-
sistently violated the fundamental principle declared by the Fourth
Amendment . . . .”294  The Court even observed that the actions of the
officers violated federal criminal laws and directed the clerk of the
Court to forward a copy of its opinion to the Attorney General of the
United States.295  Nevertheless, the Court held that the decision of
whether evidence should be excluded as a result of the illegal manner
in which it was obtained was a matter for the states to decide, as the
Court had previously ruled in Wolf v. Colorado.296  The four-justice
plurality did invite state courts to revisit their decisions permitting the
admission of illegally obtained evidence.  California did so the follow-
ing year, in another case involving an illegal entry into a home by the
LAPD to install a dictaphone.
The California Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule in this
case, People v. Cahan, which served as a substantial basis for the deci-
sion in Mapp.  The facts of Cahan were nearly identical to the facts of
Irvine.  In each case, listening devices were hidden in private homes
and weeks of intimate conversations were intercepted in an effort to
gather evidence of illegal gambling.297  The modus operandi of the
LAPD in its investigation of gambling cases rivaled the search and
seizure tactics of officers attempting to enforce Prohibition.298
Nowhere else in the country did gambling enforcement prompt a
change in search and seizure laws.  Three other states adopted the ex-
clusionary rule between the end of Prohibition and the decision in
290. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
291. Id. at 130–31.
292. Id. at 131.
293. Id. at 130–31.
294. Id. at 132.
295. Id. at 137–38.
296. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); see also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31–33
(1949).
297. People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 905–06 (Cal. 1955); Irvine, 347 U.S. at 130–31.
298. Cahan, 282 P.2d at 906.
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Mapp, and gambling enforcement had nothing to do with these
changes.299  The United States Supreme Court in Mapp assumed that
the California Supreme Court’s Cahan decision addressed a national
concern.  The exact opposite appears to be true.  Chief Justice Traynor
appears to have been addressing a local concern.  Citizens of Los An-
geles were living in a world in which the privacy and liberty concerns
of Prohibition were still very much alive.  Elsewhere, police brutality
concerns dwarfed any concerns about search and seizure, yet Mapp’s
ruling was limited and only addressed these local search and seizure
issues.
The opportunity Mapp missed became painfully apparent just four
years later when officers in California performed an arrest in a man-
ner that ignited a literal firestorm.  The Watts Riots, the most deadly
and costly urban uprisings in the country to that point, were sparked
by efforts to subdue a drunk driving suspect and the suspect’s mother
who may have been interfering with the arrest.300  On August 11,
1965, the California Highway Patrol stopped Marquette Frye in South
Los Angeles suspecting he was intoxicated.301  As one would expect,
the facts of the encounter were disputed.  At some point during the
stop, Marquette’s mother Rena Frye, who lived nearby, arrived.302
Ms. Frye began to chastise either her son or the officers.303  One of-
ficer claimed Ms. Frye spat upon him.304  There were conflicting ac-
counts over whether Ms. Frye then physically interfered with efforts to
arrest her son.  Some sort of physical tussle ensued with one officer
pulling a gun on Marquette before he and his mother were placed in
police cars.305
The crowd of onlookers did not perceive this as an isolated incident.
Police brutality against African Americans had been a frequent com-
plaint in Los Angeles as it had in a number of American cities.  The
tense standoff became particularly violent when false rumors spread
throughout the crowd that Rena Frye had been physically struck by
officers and that a pregnant woman in the crowd had also been as-
saulted.306  Rocks, bottles, and pieces of wood and concrete were
hurled at the officers.  Six days of looting and arson followed, with at
299. State v. Mills, 246 N.C. 237 (N.C. 1957); State v. Hillman, 125 A.2d 96 (R.I. 1956); Ric-
kards v. State, 77 A.2d 199 (Del. 1950).
300. GERALD HORNE, FIRE THIS TIME: THE WATTS UPRISING AND THE 1960S, at 54 (1995).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 55.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 54.
306. HORNE, supra note 300, at 55.
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least thirty-four deaths, injury to over a thousand people, and $40 mil-
lion worth of property damage.307
Watts was far from the only city to erupt during this turbulent time.
Police brutality claims also sparked riots in Newark, Detroit, and
Cleveland.308  As a result of allegations of unjustified uses of police
force against African Americans, the Black Panther Party developed
in Oakland, California.309  While African Americans were the most
frequent victims of police harassment, they were not the only groups
that were viewed suspiciously by police or distrusted officers.  The ac-
tivities of communists, hippies, and gays were also rigorously scruti-
nized by police.310
In this atmosphere of profound distrust between police and African
American citizens, the United States Supreme Court took up the case
of Terry v. Ohio.311  For the first time, the Supreme Court was asked
to consider the right of an officer to stop and frisk a citizen on the
basis of some level of suspicion less than probable cause.312  Though
the facts of Terry did not expressly require the Court to answer this
question, the parties assumed that an implicit issue in the case was the
legitimacy of field interrogations, something the Court left for another
time.313
In Terry, Cleveland Police Officer Martin McFadden was patrolling
the streets when he saw three men acting suspiciously in front of a
jewelry store.314  Two of the men were standing on the sidewalk and
took turns walking past the jewelry store, peering in the window each
time.315  The two men took between ten and twelve trips each past the
store window.316  Officer McFadden confronted them and asked for
their names.317  Officer McFadden frisked the men, discovering two of
them were armed.318  These two men were charged with unlawful pos-
session of a concealed weapon.319
307. Id. at 55–56.
308. MOORE, supra note 241, at 12.
309. BLOOM & MARTIN, supra note 248, at 20–28.
310. See Joseph Gerald Woods, The Progressives and the Police: Urban Police and the Profes-
sionalism of the Los Angeles Police (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, UCLA) (on file
with author).
311. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
312. Id. at 9–10 (noting that the case presented “issues that have never before been presented
to this Court”).
313. Id. at 15–16.
314. Id. at 1.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1 (1968).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 4–8.
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The case presented the Supreme Court with a disconnect between
theory and practice.  Officer McFadden’s actions were consistent with
a common practice in the 1960s known as “field interrogations.”  Of-
ficers routinely stopped individuals they found suspicious and ques-
tioned them and for their own safety routinely frisked those
stopped.320  Fourth Amendment doctrines at that point, however, rec-
ognized no category of suspicion justifying an investigative detention
or pat-down.321  Common law judges at the time the Bill of Rights was
drafted had no occasion to consider the limits of field interrogations.
Eighteenth century officers by and large conducted no investigations.
Suspects were questioned only by magistrates after constables ar-
rested them on the basis of probable cause, and generally with a war-
rant for the suspect’s arrest.  Modern police departments were
charged with maintaining order and investigating crime.  Field interro-
gations are part of the modern model of policing, but certainly not the
early American model.  With the heightened racial tensions of the
1960s this tactic would proliferate in ways that were racially biased.
The Fourth Amendment lexicon in 1968, however, lacked a way to
describe field interrogations or evaluate their reasonableness.
The NAACP filed an amicus brief in Terry opposing field interroga-
tions, arguing that distrust between minority communities and the po-
lice could be attributed to this practice.  Quoting a 1967 report by the
National Crime Commission on the Police, the NAACP contended
that:
Misuse of field interrogations . . . is causing serious friction with
minority groups in many localities.  This is becoming particularly
true as more police departments adopt “aggressive patrols” in which
officers are encouraged to stop and question persons on the streets
who are unknown to them, who are suspicious, or whose purpose
for being abroad is not readily evident.322
This practice disproportionately affected the minority communities
of Los Angeles.  Black residents of Watts and other African American
neighborhoods were routinely frisked due to a Los Angeles Police De-
partment policy of aggressively patrolling those neighborhoods.323
320. See George E. Dix, Nonarrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure Law, 1985
DUKE L. J. 849, 855 (“In retrospect, it is clear that the Court’s objective in the Terry trilogy was
merely to announce the framework that it would use to address nonarrest detention issues until
it had more experience in the nonarrest detention area.”).
321. Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 50–51 (describing the new
framework created).
322. Brief for the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at
61, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (Nos. 63, 74, 67) (quoting President’s Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police 184 (1967)).
323. BLOOM & MARTIN, supra note 248, at 28.
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The offensive nature of aggressive field interrogation practices cannot
be understated. Terry v. Ohio permitted officers to briefly detain and
frisk individuals on the streets upon a showing of an articulable basis
for suspicion, a standard less than probable cause.324  If the officer
additionally had reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed and
dangerous, Terry further permitted the officer to perform a pat-down
for weapons.325
The Court was not unsympathetic to the concerns raised by the
NAACP, but correctly observed that the “exclusionary rule has its
limitations . . . as a tool of judicial control” and “in some contexts the
rule is ineffective as a deterrent.”326  If the goal of a frisk is not to
obtain evidence, the exclusionary rule the Court required of the states
in Mapp was of no use.  The Court further observed, however, that the
“wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community
of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain,
will not be stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal
trial.”327  Unjustified uses of non-lethal and lethal force obviously also
fell outside the scope of regulation created in Mapp.
Unquestionably, the Court was correct about this conclusion.  Com-
bining the Court’s reasoning in Mapp and Terry, however, leads to an
unsatisfying result.  The exclusionary rule was necessary, the Court in-
formed us in Mapp, because other methods of curbing police miscon-
duct had proven ineffective.  Yet in Terry, the Court acknowledged
that police harassment was occurring and that the exclusionary rule
could do nothing to prevent it. Terry thus identified a wrong for
which it provided no remedy.  This disconnect was a problem of the
Court’s own making.
Only seven years prior, Mapp supplemented the ineffective deter-
rent mechanisms of tort damages and internal police regulations with
the exclusionary rule.  The Court had elected a remedy capable of reg-
ulating Prohibition Era fears of physical searches, but not the well-
grounded fears of African Americans about policing in the 1960s.
And the election of this particular remedy left unregulated a range of
324. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968).
325. Id. at 21.  A federal district judge enjoined the aggressive use of this procedure in New
York City despite the precedent in Terry.  The court’s injunction did not end this story.  The
claim that aggressive field interrogations violate the Constitution had a quite tortured process
through the courts, ending in a consent decree.  Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate
Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397,
2400–01 (2017).
326. Id. at 23; Fagan, supra note 321, at 49 (“In effect, the Court said that the exclusionary
rule was powerless and irrelevant to the realities of contemporary beat policing.”).
327. Id. at 14–15.
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police activity unrelated to the search for evidence, from probing
questions to lethal force.
Like claims of harassment in Terry, excessive use of force by police
officers is believed to disproportionately affect minority communi-
ties.328  Tort actions are particularly unable to define the parameters
for the excessive use of force.  Courts, in an effort to prevent crushing
civil liability, second-guessing officers, and risking officer safety have
allowed claims to go forward only if plaintiffs can get past an officer’s
defense of qualified immunity—thus, it must be plain to any reasona-
ble officer that his use of force was unreasonable.329  Further, courts
have analyzed most use of force cases as split-second decisions, giving
further deference to officers.  When split-second decisions are in-
volved, this deference is certainly justified.  But many incidents of po-
lice force involve opportunities to call for backup, engage in tactical
retreat, or delay a suspect in order to avoid a life-or-death decision.330
A tort remedy that allows a jury to assess damages risks over-deter-
ring police interventions, or worse, might force an officer to choose
between a lawsuit and his life.  Just as juries might undervalue an ille-
gal search, the current scheme is designed to prevent a risk that the
jury will over compensate a victim of police violence, creating incen-
tives for officers that place themselves or the public at risk.
A meaningful alternative to the exclusionary rule—one that gives
judges an opportunity to pass on the legitimacy of police force in a
setting in which over compensation could be prevented—was lost
when Mapp v. Ohio adopted a remedy aimed only to prevent illegal
searches.  As an example, injunctions against Fourth Amendment vio-
lations that give judges the flexibility to tailor the sanction would pre-
vent the problem of over compensation.331  Judges, not juries, would
thus be entrusted to apportion remedies based on the severity of the
violation, subject to review by appellate courts.332  Importantly, such a
mechanism would require judges to pass on the legitimacy of the use
of force.  Just as the exclusionary rule has provided officers guidance
on the appropriateness of searches, such a system would give officers
328. Kevin P. Jenkins, Police Use of Deadly Force Against Minorities: Ways to Stop the Killing,
9 HARV. BLACKLETTER L. J. 1, 1 (1992) (describing studies examining causes for “disproportion-
ately high rates of the use of excessive force or deadly force against minorities”).
329. Diana Hassell, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117, 117–18 (2009).
330. Seth Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 864–69 (2014); Brandon Garrett &
Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211, 228–36 (2017).
331. Ronald J. Rychlak, Replacing the Exclusionary Rule: Fourth Amendment Violations as
Direct Criminal Contempt, 85 CHI. KENT L. REV. 241, 241 (2010).
332. Joshua P. Davis, Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Reversing Injunction Doctrine, 34
RUTGERS L. J. 363, 385 (2003).
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and police academies a body of law delineating the limits on the use of
force.  No doubt, fashioning such a remedy would have been difficult,
and the rule messy.  But if Mapp had addressed the concerns of the
day and the apparent concerns of the Court at the time, then the
Court’s criminal procedure refinements over the past fifty years would
not have been incorrectly limited to a societal concern that was promi-
nent in the 1920s.
V. CONCLUSION
Mapp v. Ohio was a decision from another time.  It adapted a Pro-
hibition era remedy to a world in which police violence was of far
greater concern than illegal searches and seizures.  As a result of
Mapp, officers now know when they are allowed to search the trunk
of a car, but have no idea when they need to engage in a tactical re-
treat, avoid using a chokehold, or wait for backup before applying
force to subdue a suspect.333  Creativity and innovation would have
been required to fashion a remedy in 1961 that addressed both the
illegal searches and the questionable use of force.  Courts prefer not
to be innovators.  The exclusionary rule had a long pedigree—it ex-
isted in some form for at least a century before Mapp.
In adapting this remedy to a post-Prohibition world, however, the
Court adopted a rule that was not well-received by the public.  In
1921, the paradigmatic application of the exclusionary rule prevented
a bootlegging conviction.  In 1961 and thereafter, the exclusionary
rule was perceived to prevent the conviction of drug dealers and vio-
lent criminals.334  Though imposing a relatively old rule on the states,
Mapp was seen as a revolutionary decision.  It seems unlikely that a
rule devised by the Court addressing police force would have been as
controversial as the application of the exclusionary rule in a post-Pro-
hibition world.
The Mapp decision was not revolutionary.  Its conservative ap-
proach was its failing.  The exclusionary rule was a well-developed
doctrine in 1961, but one addressing a concern from another era.
Avoiding innovation, the Court drew the ire of contemporary society
and left American law without a meaningful mechanism to limit ex-
cessive force, wrongful shootings, or even police harassment for de-
cades to come.
333. See Stoughton, supra note 330, at 864–69.
334. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
200–01 (2011) (observing that cases regulating liquor searches are not suitable for the regulation
of murder and drug investigations).
